A Bridge Too Far: Court Limits Scope of First Step Act in Felon-in-Possession Case


Early one morning, Joey Wiseman woke to the sound of someone attempting to break into his apartment.  Using his video surveillance system, Wiseman discovered that the individual was armed with a handgun  Wiseman, who was armed himself, encountered the assailant, knocked the gun out of his hand, and then shot him.  With his would-be robber bleeding on his living room floor, Wiseman, who was a convicted felon, faced a difficult choice: should he first call 9-1-1 or hide both the gun and the multiple grams of cocaine that were in his apartment?  He chose the later.  After hiding the cocaine and gun in a safe in his car, Wiseman called 9-1-1.  In a subsequent interview, however, Wiseman admitted to the police that he hid the handgun and cocaine in his car, and the police subsequently seized both items after obtaining a search warrant.

A federal grand jury subsequently indicted Wiseman for two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.  In addition, the Government filed an 851 notice that Wiseman had prior felony drug convictions it would rely upon in enhancing his maximum sentence from twenty to thirty years pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C).

A jury subsequently convicted Wiseman of all three counts.  The District Court, after finding that he was a career offender, sentenced Wiseman to 262 months imprisonment.

On appeal, Wiseman turned to the First Step Act as a basis for many of his arguments. First he challenged the enhancement of his sentence, arguing that he was not eligible for the sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 851(a) because he had not committed any "serious drug felonies" as defined under the First Step Act.  He also argued that the District Court erred in denying his request for a justification instruction and in overruling his objection to testimony during his trial from a special agent that he had received "a call from Adult Parole Authority."  Finally,  citing the First Step Act, Wiseman argued the District Court erred in finding he was a career offender under the Guidelines because he had served less than a year imprisonment on each of his supposedly qualifying charges.

In its decision in United States v. Wiseman, the Court rejected all of Wiseman's arguments and affirmed both his conviction and sentence.  First, the Court held that the First Step Act, which became effective after his conviction, was not retroactive, and, even if it was, it did not alter the language for qualifying convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).

The Court also concluded that the District Court properly rejected Wiseman's request for a justification instruction.  Wiseman, the Court noted, failed to show that he was justified in possessing the firearm because he possessed it long before he saw the would-be robber enter his home.  In addition, the Court noted that Wiseman continued possessing the gun after the danger had passed by placing the weapon in a safe before the police arrived.

The Court similarly rejected Wiseman's challenge to the admission of the special agent's testimony implying that he was on parole status.  The jury, the Court concluded, was already well aware that Wiseman had a prior felony conviction because he had been charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and because he had stipulated prior to trial that he had felony convictions.  The Court thus held that any error was harmless.

 Finally, in challenging the District Court's finding that he was a career offender, Wiseman argued that the District Court should have considered the definition of a "serious drug felony" under the First Step Act in its analysis.  The Court disagreed and noted that the Act did not alter the definition of offenses that qualify for career offender status under the Guidelines.

Less than a year into its implementation, courts are still addressing the scope of the First Step Act. We will no doubt continue to see cases like this one addressing creative arguments under the Act.

  







United States v. Bailey: Court Holds Guidelines Cross-Reference Provision Covers Attempts to Obstruct


After a jury convicted her then-boyfriend, Michael Clayton, of sexually exploiting a minor, Davi Bailey used Facebook Messenger to send threatening messages to one of the testifying witnesses and her sister.  Bailey subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of witness retaliation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(1), (c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2) for threatening the witness's sister after the trial.  She subsequently appealed the 78-month sentence imposed by the District Court.

On appeal, Bailey challenged both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of her sentence.  In particular, she argued that the District Court erred in applying the cross-reference pursuant to USSG § 2J1.2(c)(1) because it does not apply to attempted obstruction and Clayton was ultimately convicted.

The Court disagreed.  Citing language from the obstruction of justice provision, USSG § 2J1.2, dicta in its prior decision in United States v. Roche, and case law from other circuits, the Court held that cross-reference provision covers attempted obstruction.  It also did not matter, the Court concluded, that Bailey made her threats after Clayton had been convicted since the prosecution did not end until he had been sentenced.

You can find the Court's opinion here.

Voisine and Verwiebe Strike Again: Court Denies Rehearing but Notes Circuit Split

James Walker, a convicted felon, found employment managing a rooming house.  One day, he discovered thirteen bullets on the property and removed them for safekeeping.  This resulted in his subsequent indictment by a federal grand jury and his ultimate conviction in 2010 for being a felon in possession of ammunition.  During his sentencing, the District Court held he was subject to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum (180-month) sentence under the ACCA.

After the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Johnson v. United States in 2015, Mr. Walker sought habeas relief by arguing he was not an armed career criminal because several of his prior convictions no longer qualified as "violent" felonies.  The District Court agreed and resentenced him to 88 months imprisonment.  The Government appealed.

On appeal, Mr. Walker argued that his 1982 Texas robbery conviction did not constitute a "crime of violence" because it also included reckless conduct.  In an unpublished opinion, the Court, citing its decisions in Verwiebe and Davis, held that the conviction qualified as  a "violent" felony under the ACCA -- even though it included reckless conduct -- and remanded the case for resentencing.  Judge Stranch issued a concurring opinion criticizing the Court's decision in Verwiebe for improperly expanding upon the Supreme Court's decision in Voisine but holding that the Court was nevertheless bound to existing precedent.

In a recent order, the Court denied Mr. Walker's petition for rehearing en banc, and, unlike its original opinion, agreed to publish its decision. Judges Kethledge, Moore, Stranch, and White would have granted rehearing, however, and Judges Kethledge and Stranch entered separate dissenting opinions.  In their dissents, both judges acknowledged that, prior to Voisine, courts uniformly held that crimes including the reckless use of force did not qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA.  They also agreed that some circuits, including the Sixth Circuit, have incorrectly expanded Voisine's reach, resulting in a circuit split.  Judge Kethledge noted that Voisine construed a different provision -- a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" -- and that the Court has incorrectly applied the same construction to the definition of a "violent felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).

Judge Stranch wrote separately to state that the Supreme Court in Voisine left open the possibility for "divergent" readings of the use of force requirement.  This, she explained, gave the Court an avenue to rehear Mr. Walker's case.

Sadly, Mr. Walker, who is now 65-years old, must return to prison to serve the remainder of his fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA for possessing thirteen bullets.  His case reminds us that there are divergent opinions about the application of Voisine to the reckless use of force and that defense counsel should continue litigating such issues.

You can find the Court's order here.