In United States v. Tucci-Jarraf, this Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of co-defendants Beane and Tucci-Jarraf for defrauding the United States out of $31 million. Beane became immersed in internet conspiracy theory and adopted the "straw man conspiracy theory." The theory essentially held that all American citizens have a right to tap into unlimited funds from the Federal Reserve. To his detriment, Bean then stumbled upon Tucci-Jarraf, a one-time attorney turned conspiracy wonk who posted videos and other information about how to access these funds.The two joined forces to obtain $31 million in government money before being arrested. (The detailed facts are well-worth reading if you have the time). Their actions amounted to wire fraud with both individuals facing serious prison time and an incredible amount of restitution.
Both Beane and Tucci-Jarraf opted for self-representation. They wanted to represent themselves to advance the conspiracy theories they both adopted as defensive arguments. These beliefs were varied but included some of the same features as the "sovereign citizen" arguments that many defense attorneys are familiar with hearing from conspiracy-leaning clients. The district court conducted full Faretta hearings for both defendants, granted their request, and appointed standby counsel. Both defendants were convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms.
On appeal, both individuals argued that they should not have been allowed to represent themselves because their unorthodox views rendered them essentially incapable of self-representation or meant that they were incompetent to proceed to trial. But authoring Judge Sutton eloquently explains that the right to represent yourself does not include a paternalistic duty on the part of the court to save you from yourself where actual counsel would be a better choice. There was also no evidence of mental incompetency.
In a particularly stirring paragraph, Judge Sutton explains that while being a citizen does not give unlimited access to government funds, "it does come with a view of the dignity of individuals to make weighty decisions for themselves." The Court noted that the right to self-representation does not come with the same requirements of effectiveness that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel contains. "Exercising these rights sometimes costs individuals more than they ever could stand to gain. But the Constitution lets American citizens learn that lesson the hard way."
A blog by federal public defenders and criminal defense lawyers practicing in the Sixth Circuit.
The Not So Saving Clause: Court Tightens Relief Available for Second Habeas Petitions
It would be an understatement to say that the saving
clause found in § 2255(e) has been heavily litigated. The Sixth Circuit
continued that trend in Wright v. Spaulding…with
a flourish.
In the pre-Johnson
era, William Wright pleaded guilty to being an armed career criminal and
received the mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence. Wright did not dispute
his status as an armed career criminal during his sentencing, and he did not
pursue an appeal. After the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Johnson, however, Wright filed a § 2255
motion seeking a re-sentencing. The Maryland District Court denied his petition,
however.
A year later, after the Supreme Court announced its decision
in Mathis, Wright again filed a §
2255 motion and argued that the Court should re-sentence him because one of his
prior convictions did not qualify as an ACCA predicate. Since he had previously
filed for relief before the district court that sentenced him, Wright filed his
second petition in the Northern District of Ohio – the district in which he was
imprisoned. He was again unsuccessful, however.
Mincing few words about the current scope of habeas law, the
Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Wright’s second habeas motion. Judge
Thapar, who wrote for the majority and also authored a separate concurring
opinion, criticized the current extension of habeas law, which, in the Court's opinion, had progressed “far beyond the limits
set by Congress.” Summarizing the state of habeas law
since 1948 and the application of the “saving clause” found in § 2255(e),
the Court held that federal prisoners must demonstrate they had no “prior
reasonable opportunity” to bring their claims in a previous habeas motion in
order to bring a claim of actual innocence in a § 2241 petition.
Turning to the merits of Wright’s second motion, the Court
held that he failed to demonstrate he had no “prior reasonable opportunity” to
bring his ACCA argument in his prior motion. Wright failed to do so, the Court
noted, because while Mathis may have
clarified the categorical approach and bolstered his ACCA predicate argument,
it did not create the categorical approach, and he could have raised that
argument during sentencing, on direct appeal, or in his previous habeas motion.
The saving clause was thus of no avail to him.
30-Day Sentence for Assault on Senator Rand Paul was Substantively
Unreasonable
Senator Rand
Paul was doing yard work at his home when he was attacked from behind by his
next-door neighbor, Rene Boucher. Senator Paul sustained six broken ribs which “caused
long-lasting damage to his lung, and led to several bouts of pneumonia.”
Mr. Boucher pleaded
guilty to assaulting a member of Congress in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 351(e)
and while he admitted tackling the Senator, he denied that he did so for
political reasons. He told the police that the assault stemmed from “a property
dispute that finally boiled over.”
Mr. Boucher’s
guidelines range was 21 to 27 months but he was sentenced to 30 days
imprisonment. The government appealed and argued that the sentence was
substantively unreasonable. In United States v. Boucher, the Sixth Circuit agreed, vacated the sentence and
remanded for resentencing.
The Sixth
Circuit noted that the district court’s rationale for imposing a 30 day
sentence “rested primarily on two observations.” The first was that the
confrontation was “strictly a dispute between neighbors.” The second was Mr.
Boucher’s “excellent background.”
The Sixth
Circuit’s opinion provides a thorough discussion of substantive reasonableness
analysis and role that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors play in it. The court applied
a familiar principle in resolving this case – the more a district court varies
above or below the guidelines, the more compelling the justification must be.
The district
court’s analysis was found to be flawed for several reasons. It did not
adequately explain why the 30-day sentence was appropriate given the severity
of the Senator’s injuries. Although the assault may not have been politically
motivated, the Senator’s “status as a national political figure is still
relevant to the broader ‘goals of societal deterrence’” because § 351(e)’s
objective is to protect elected representatives from harm. But here the district
court offered no explanation why that objective did not warrant a within guidelines
sentence.
The district
court described Mr. Boucher as “a 60 year old highly educated medical doctor,
Army veteran, father, church member, and good standing community member with no
criminal history.” But, as the Sixth Circuit pointed out, those factors (with
the exception of military service) are disfavored as reasons for a below guidelines
sentence and the district court failed to explain “what unusual circumstances
justified relying on them” in this case.
The last factor
to consider was unwarranted disparities. Although the district court did not
state that it used Kentucky law as a reference to determine Mr. Boucher’s sentence, the Sixth
Circuit reiterated that “it is impermissible for a district court to consider
the defendant’s likely state court sentence as a factor in determining his
federal sentence.” The only relevant disparities “are those among federal defendants
on a national scale” and while cases under § 351(e) were considered, the “more telling
comparators are in cases drawn from other federal assault statutes.” The
Sentencing Commission’s national sentencing data is also an important factor in
avoiding unwarranted sentence disparities. The district court in Mr. Boucher’s
case, however, did not address the risk of sentence disparities.
Because Mr.
Boucher’s case was a “mine-run case,” the Sixth Circuit applied “closer review”
to the variance from the guidelines and it found “no compelling justification”
for his “well-below Guidelines sentence.” The Sixth Circuit acknowledged,
however, that Mr. Boucher “may or may not be entitled to a downward variance
after the district court reweighs the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and it is the
district court’s right to make that decision in the first instance.”
2255 Provides No Relief for Defendants Sentenced Under Mis-Advisory Guidelines
“The lodestar,” the “starting
point,” the “initial benchmark,” and “central”—these are words the U.S.
Supreme Court has used to describe the Sentencing Guidelines. As the Court acknowledged,
the U.S.
Sentencing Commission’s research confirms, those words accurately describe
the anchoring effect of the Sentencing Guidelines. When the Guidelines range increases,
then sentences get longer.
More recently, the Supreme court
held that “an error resulting in a higher range than the Guidelines provide usually
establishes a reasonable probability that a defendant will serve a prison
sentence that is more than ‘necessary’ to fulfill the purposes of
incarceration.”
Rosales-Mireles
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1907 (2018). Thus, plain Guidelines
errors should be corrected even if they are unpreserved because “[t]he risk of
unnecessary deprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings in the context of a
plain Guidelines error because of the role the district court plays in
calculating the range and the relative ease of correcting the error.” Id. at 1908.
One of the most consequential
guidelines in the Sentencing Manual is the Career-Offender Guideline, U.S.S.C. § 4B1.1. Under
that provision, defendants who have been convicted of two or more felonies that
are “crimes of violence” or “controlled substance offenses” face a dramatic
increase in the overall offense level. Their Criminal History Category also
changes, as it must be VI—the highest level available. Consequently, the
career-offender designation catapults defendants into significantly higher
Guidelines ranges.
What should happen if, a few
years after a sentence became final, a defendant learns that the court should
not have treated him as a career offender in the first place?
At the time Dwight Bullard was sentenced,
the Sixth Circuit treated attempted drug trafficking offenses as “controlled
substance offenses” based on the commentary to the Career-Offender Guideline.
Nothing in the text of the Guideline supported the theory that attempt offenses
satisfied the definition of a “controlled substance offense,” and so the Sixth Circuit corrected
course this year in United States v.
Havis.
Because of Havis, the “starting point” for his sentence changed from 292–365
months to 92–115 months, Mr. Bullard filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to
vacate his sentence. Although judge did not sentence him within the advisory Guideline
range, his final sentence of 140 months’ incarceration was above the correct
sentence.
This week, the Sixth
Circuit held that Mr. Bullard cannot get a new sentencing hearing because
the incorrect Guideline calculation did not result in “a complete miscarriage
of justice.” According to the Court, the advisory nature of the Guidelines
makes it too hard to determine of the misapplication of the Guideline renders a
sentence fundamentally unfair, and so these claims are not cognizable on
collateral review.
Mr. Bullard and his family may not think a sentence 35 months above “the
initial benchmark” is fair. But unless the en banc court or the Supreme Court
intervene, people like Mr. Bullard, whose time as passed to file a direct
appeal, have to serve sentences affected by erroneous Guideline calculations.
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