Big Win on a First Step Act case - pro-se defendant!!!

Back in 2006, Defendant Marty Smith was sentenced to 240 months, despite the fact that his Guidelines range was 168-210 months.  This was due to the fact that the Government had filed a notice pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 851, raising his mandatory minimum to 20 years (240 months). 

When the First Step Act was passed in 2018, Smith sent a letter to the district court (Eastern District of Kentucky) asking that counsel be appointed for the filing of an FSA motion.  (It should be noted that the Eastern District of Kentucky remains one of the only districts in the country devoid of a Federal Defenders office.)  Instead of appointing counsel, the district court (1) construed the letter request as an FSA motion, (2) found that the FSA did indeed apply, and (3) decided that Smith should not receive a reduced sentence.  In denying the motion, the court noted that Smith's current Guidelines range would be 77-96 months.

Smith appealed (still acting pro-se), arguing that the failure to reduce the sentence was improper.  The Sixth Circuit first noted that the decision to not reduce the sentence, under these circumstances, amounted to an upward variance from the Guidelines range.  Leaning on the Court's rationale in United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2012), the Court found that the sentence of 240 constituted a "major" variance from the Guidelines range, and thus should have been supported by "significant justification" on the record.  The district court,in the Sixth Circuit's opinion, provided no such justification.  Opinion 

However, the Court even went further.  Opining on the passage of the First Step Act itself, the Court held that "the fact that Congress was the actor that reduced Smith’s guideline range through the passage of the First Step Act, rather than the Sentencing Commission, if anything increases rather than decreases the need to justify disagreement with the guideline."  The court found that everything the district court did discuss in denying a reduction was adequately considered in the  current Guidelines range.  Thus, resentencing was required.

Court holds that no "proximate cause" required to be proven in death overdose case

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(c), a defendant's statutory sentencing range is increased from 0-20 years to 20 years to life if "death or injury results from the use of such substance."  The question raised in United States v. Jeffries 18-4081 was: does the Government have to prove proximate cause between the defendant's actions and the death?  In a In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit held that no such proximate cause is necessary.

Relying on the term "results from," as well as an interpretation of the Supreme Court decision in  Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014), the Court found that

Section 841(b)(1)(C) is merely the penalty tied to the conduct proscribed in § 841(a)(1). It does not speak to the defendant’s conduct or the general causal connection between § 841(a)(1) and the death. The penalty provision speaks only to the specific connection between the use of the drugs distributed by the defendant and the death that resulted from that use. 

The Court further determined that the mens rea for this statute is specifically limited to the distribution element of the offense.

Judge Donald provided a strong dissent from the panel opinion, finding that the language of the statute in this regard was ambiguous, and therefore, the Rule of Lenity applied.  Judge Donald further found that requiring proof of proximate cause, under these circumstances, would be consistent with traditional criminal law concepts.

Will there be future litigation on this topic and in this case?  Please stay tuned!!!