The remedy provided by Booker makes the federal Sentencing Guidelines no longer mandatory. Now, a district court must impose a reasonable sentence considering the applicable guideline range in an advisory manner among the statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). So, how do we convince the federal judges we practice before what we believe is a reasonable sentence IS in fact a reasonable sentence? We must do it together through Booker brainstorming. The Sixth Circuit covers Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky and Tennessee - big states & lots of districts within those states. Booker brainstorming is but one way we talented criminal defense lawyers in these states can help each other. We should strive to continue to share our ideas in a group effort to do the best job we can for our clients. I encourage you to e-mail these ideas to me as well for collection and distribution - email@example.com.
Sentencing Disparity for Crack Cocaine - Pre-Booker, we all tried it, and we all failed in an effort to challenge the harsher guideline ranges for crack cocaine on grounds of due process, etc. Booker opens a door that has been shut for so long. We can now argue that this same sentencing disparity warrants a sentence below the advisory guideline range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) ("the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity"). In the right case with the right facts, this argument will indeed work. Ask CJA Panel Attorney David M. Eldridge who recently convinced Judge Greer to reject the advisory career offender guideline range for Nicholas Clay who was convicted by a jury of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. See United States v. Clayton Wilkins, et. al, No. 2:03-CR-73 (ED TN Apr. 15, 2005) . Judge Greer imposed a reasonable sentence - 156 months imprisonment followed by 4 years of supervised release, down from the applicable advisory career offender guideline range of 360 months to life imprisonment. In a sentencing memorandum submitted to the court before the sentencing hearing, David details the disparity in treatment of crack cocaine and powder cocaine in the application of mandatory minimum terms of incarceration and sentencing guideline calculations, often called the 100 to 1 quantity ratio (50 grams of crack is treated the same as 5,000 grams of powder cocaine). He cited a recent study by the United States Sentencing Commission documenting the disparity, see U.S. Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of GuidelinesSentencing, pp. xv-xvi (Nov. 2004) (available on the Commission’s website at: http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15year.htm). In that study, the Commission reports that "the harms associated with crack cocaine do not justify its substantially harsher treatment compared to powder cocaine." David did not rely on the sentencing disparity alone. He also presented a full mitigation workup within the sentencing memorandum after having received CJA funds for a mitigation specialist. See United States v. Clayton Wilkins, et. al, No. 2:03-CR-73 (ED TN Mar. 15, 2005) (Sentencing Memorandum). The sentencing disparity simply gave Judge Greer the means by which to reach the end he wanted, a lesser more reasonable sentence. Several other district courts have applied this sentencing disparity argument to reach a more reasonable sentence below the advisory guideline range. See United States v. John Smith, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2005 WL 549057, *6-*10 (ED Wis. Mar. 3, 2005); Simon v. United States, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2005 WL 711916, (ED NY Mar. 17, 2005); United States v. Harris, 2005 US Dist. LEXIS 3958 (DC Mar. 7, 2005).