From
drones to pole cameras, law enforcement now has more non-human surveillance
options at its disposal than ever before.
By extension, courts are continually attempting to define the limits of
what is permissible with such searches under the Fourth Amendment.
In
United States v. Houston, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed Defendant Rocky Houston’s conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). One of the main arguments Houston raised on
appeal was his allegation that the District Court erred in denying his motion
to suppress any evidence obtained from surveillance video taken from his
property by a pole camera installed by the ATF on a public utility pole located
across the street from his mobile home.
ATF agents installed the camera and conducted surveillance of Houston’s
residence for ten weeks without a warrant.
During this period, the ATF obtained video evidence that Houston
possessed firearms. The ATF subsequently
obtained a warrant for the surveillance after the Sixth Circuit issued its
opinion in United States v.
Anderson-Bagshaw, 509 F.App’x 396 (6th Cir. 2012), in which it
expressed “some misgivings” about the constitutionality of long-term
warrantless surveillance of a defendant’s back yard via a pole camera.
In
its opinion, the Court held that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because
Houston had no reasonable expectation of privacy in video footage of his
property obtained by the pole camera because it “captured the same views
enjoyed by passersby on public roads.”
The Court further held that the length of the warrantless surveillance
did not render the surveillance unconstitutional “because the Fourth Amendment
does not punish law enforcement for using technology to more efficiently conduct
their investigations.” Although it is a
painful thought, the Court reasoned that the ATF could have stationed an agent
on top of the utility pole for ten weeks the same as it placed a camera there
and that the Fourth Amendment should not prevent the Government from using more
efficient means to conduct surveillance.
In
his concurring opinion, Judge Rose, sitting by designation, did not share the
majority’s comfort with the warrantless surveillance. Citing Anderson-Bagshaw and Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States
v. Jones, he explained that “long-term non-human surreptitious surveillance
‘is worrisome because ‘it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices….'” He placed
particular emphasis on the fact that the pole camera conducted such lengthy
surveillance of Houston’s residence.
Judge Rose further disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the
Fourth Amendment should not hamstring the Government’s use of technology by
noting that it can always regain “the upper hand” by obtaining a search warrant.
In
the end, however, Judge Rose concluded that any error in the warrantless
surveillance was harmless because the Government had probable cause to obtain
the subsequent warrant. Additionally,
Judge Rose explained that there was sufficient evidence to convict Houston even
in the absence of any evidence tainted by an unlawful search.
The
Court’s decision in this case raises an issue that should be of great concern
to defense counsel: as advances in technology increase the Government's capacity to conduct surveillance from public areas, just how long is too long? Could the Government document a subject's movements for a year without a warrant in the hopes of obtaining incriminatory evidence? This will not be the last time the Sixth Circuit addresses this issue.
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