Wednesday, April 05, 2017

Prior Convictions can count as crimes of violence under the Guidelines and as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)


United States v. Patterson involves the defendant’s direct appeal and the government’s cross-appeal of the district court’s sentencing decision.

          Mr. Patterson was convicted in Ohio state court of receiving stolen property and a traffic offense. The same incident also resulted in a federal prosecution and conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court denied Mr. Patterson’s motion to dismiss the firearm charge on double jeopardy grounds. The district court, however, counted Mr. Patterson’s prior Ohio convictions for aggravated robbery as crimes of violence under the Guidelines but not as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss but reversed the district court’s sentencing decision because the prior convictions met the requirements of the Guidelines and the ACCA.

          The Sixth Circuit first noted that dual prosecutions do not constitute double jeopardy because Ohio and the United States are separate sovereigns and may prosecute a person under their separate legal systems. Mr. Patterson, however, contended that the government acted in “bad faith” because it should have notified him of its intention to file federal charges when he was considering the State’s plea offer. The Sixth Circuit explained that the record did not show that there was any federal collaboration in the state prosecution. The federal government was not involved in the state plea negotiations and the State did not promise Mr. Patterson that he would not be subject to a federal prosecution. In the court’s view, there was no evidence of bad faith. The court, however, did not reject Mr. Patterson’s bad faith argument out of hand and the implication is that it could work in a different situation.

          The “heart” of the case, however, was whether Mr. Patterson’s prior aggravated robbery convictions were predicate offenses under the ACCA. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis focused on the ACCA’s “elements clause” which describes a “violent felony” as an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Using the categorical approach to determine whether the “elements clause” encompassed aggravated robbery, the Sixth Circuit looked at the statutory definition of the offense rather than the underlying facts. In response to one of Mr. Patterson’s arguments, the court said it did not matter that the Ohio statute did not include an element that matched the ACCA’s elements clause word for word as long as the offense at issue required the State to prove everything included in the elements clause.

          Mr. Patterson also argued that Ohio statute did not expressly require the use of force or that the use of a deadly weapon must be against another’s person. The Sixth Circuit, however, determined that the Ohio Supreme Court construed the statute as containing those elements. As to Mr. Patterson’s argument that the statute would permit a conviction of someone who robs a store while just happening to be carrying a weapon openly (as Ohio law allows), the court said that as long as there was no reason to think that the statute could be applied to someone who used “minimal actual force” or did not threaten serious physical force against others, then “there is every reason to treat it as a crime of violence.”

          The Sixth Circuit concluded from the language of the Ohio statute and state court decisions interpreting it that aggravated robbery fell within the scope of the elements clause and was therefore a violent felony. Thus, Mr. Patterson should have been sentenced as an armed career criminal.

          Mr. Patterson raised another issue regarding his sentence. He contended that the district court committed error by treating his conviction for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon as a crime of violence when it calculated the base offense level under the Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit noted that it used authority interpreting the ACCA’s elements clause to interpret “the same phrase in the Guidelines.” That led the court to conclude that the offense qualified as a crime of violence under the Guidelines. The court also cited Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886 (2017) as a separate reason to reject Mr. Patterson’s argument because aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon “would have qualified as a crime of violence under the residual clause, which was still part of the Guidelines” when he was sentenced.   

         

 

 

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