Court Upholds Denial of Motion to Reduce Sentence

 In United States v. Davis-Malone, -- F.4th -- (6th Cir. 2025), the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to reduce his sentence based on retroactive guidelines changes after Amendment 821 took effect. The district court rejected the defendant's petition, which was supported by the government, to reduce his sentence using a form order and including only 3 sentences explaining the decision. The same judge presided over the sentencing and the motion to reduce sentence.

After the defendant twice sold oxycodone pills to an undercover agent while on probation for credit card fraud, the government obtained a warrant to search the defendant's car. "Inside the car, they found a handgun that he had made fully automatic and loaded with 23 rounds. The agents also uncovered over 100 oxycodone pills and 200 grams of marijuana hidden in a secret compartment." Davis-Malone, at page 2. The defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. His recommended sentencing guideline range was calculated to be 70 to 87 months. The defendant received a sentence of only 60 months--10 months below the guideline range. 

Davis-Malone filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to Amendment 821. After applying the amendment, his sentencing range would be 57 to 71 months. The district court rejected the joint recommendation to reduce Davis-Malone's sentence to 57 months because the original sentence falls within the low end of the new guideline range. 

The Court of Appeals upheld this decision, in part, because the same judge that sentenced Davis-Malone ruled on the motion to reduce sentence. The Court of Appeals found that the district court adequately explained its reasoning to impose a below-guidelines sentence initially, the district court--in particular the same judge as before--does not need to conduct an exhaustive analysis of the same sentencing factors as before. The Court of Appeals followed United States v. Brim, 661 F. App’x 879 (6th Cir. 2016), where the underlying facts are materially similar.