During routine
patrol in Toledo, Ohio, several police officers encountered a group of citizens
gathered in a shopping center parking lot.
The group had no apparent purpose other than to be in each other’s
company, and the officers suspected them of loitering in what police described
as a “high crime area.” While monitoring
the situation throughout the day, the officers also noticed a black man riding
a bike back and forth across the parking lot.
In order to round
up the perceived loiterers and generally prevent them from leaving, the police decided
to “bum rush” the shopping center and flood it with officers. The police used this technique every couple
of weeks to rid the area of crime.
When Toledo
Police Department Officers Toth and Niles drove toward the shopping center,
they saw a bike rider who appeared to be the same person they noticed
earlier. It turns out they were wrong;
the man on the bike was actually Dominic Jeter, who had simply entered the
grocery store, bought a snack and a bottled water, came outside for 3-4 minutes
to eat the snack and was in the process of leaving when he ran into the
cops.
The officers drove
up to Jeter, and Officer Niles rolled down the window and asked to speak to
him. Jeter was already pedaling away
from the area at that point, and he did not respond, instead “wandering away on
his bike.” Undeterred, Officers Toth and
Niles drove their police car onto the grass to keep Jeter from leaving. With his pathway blocked, Jeter stopped. Officer Niles got out of the car to talk with
him, but after looking at the officers, Jeter dropped his bike and started running
away. The officers chased him down the
alley, and saw him clutching the right front pocket of his shorts. They captured and searched him, finding a .22
caliber handgun in his right front pocket.
Jeter lost a district court motion to suppress.
Confronted
with these facts, the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Jeter, No. 12-3909 (6th Cir. Jul. 10, 2013) agreed that officers
lacked both probable cause and reasonable suspicion to suspect Jeter of crime during
their initial encounter. The Court was
unpersuaded that either Jeter or the individuals in the parking lot were
loitering. The Court rightly noted that
Jeter’s status as “a black man on a bicycle in a high crime area is not enough
to support reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause, where the facts
indicate no laws were being broken . . . .”
The agreement ended there,
however, as the Court ultimately concluded there was no Fourth Amendment
seizure since Jeter never actually submitted
to the officers’ show of authority. Rather,
because Jeter only “paused briefly,” never engaged in conversation, and ignored
the officers’ requests, the Court believed California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) compelled a finding that
no seizure had occurred.
The Court stopped short of defining what constitutes a provoked flight. But, the examples it cited suggested that fraud, threat of bodily harm, or similar police wrongdoing might be necessary to invalidate a search.
Setting aside the wisdom and implications of the Wardlow / Jeter rationale (see David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659 (1994)), for now, these cases dictate that citizens in “high crime areas” better think twice before running away from police. The full Jeter opinion is available here.
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