Sixth Circuit
construes 18 U.S.C. §3583(h) in a case of first impression
Two
weeks after Mr. Price was released from imprisonment, he violated the terms of
his supervised release by possessing and using crack cocaine and being absent
from his halfway house without permission. At the revocation hearing, Mr. Price
again sought treatment instead of incarceration. The district court considered
that option inappropriate and sentenced him to 24 months imprisonment and a 12 month
term of supervised release. The conditions of supervised release included 6
months in a halfway house. Inpatient treatment could possibly be substituted
for time in the halfway house “on a month-for-month basis.” (Op. at 3).
On
appeal, Mr. Price argued that his term of supervised release was procedurally
unreasonable because it exceeded the maximum authorized by 18 U.S.C. §3583(h). That
claim was reviewed for plain error since there was no objection in the district
court to the length of the term of supervised release.
Section
3583(h) provides that the length of a term of supervised release “shall not
exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense
that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of
imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” The statute’s
last clause not only requires the district court to subtract “the length of any
newly-imposed period of incarceration from a term of supervised release” but it
also requires the court to “subtract the length of any term of imprisonment
imposed upon a prior revocation of supervised release related to the same
underlying offense.” (Op. at 5).
Applying
§3583(h) in Mr. Price’s case, the district court correctly noted that the maximum term of supervised release on the
bank robbery conviction was 36 months. The court then subtracted the most
recent 24 month term of imprisonment and determined that the maximum for any
new term of supervised release was 12 months. The district court, however,
erred by failing to reduce the term of supervised release by the 2 month term
of imprisonment that was imposed when Mr. Price was initially revoked. The panel
majority determined that plain error occurred and had to be corrected on
remand.
Mr.
Price also argued that his 24 month sentence was substantively unreasonable
because he was not granted inpatient treatment rather than incarceration. The
Sixth Circuit found no abuse of discretion because the district court
“explicitly considered” the treatment option under 18 U.S.C. §3583(d) and
determined it was inappropriate under the circumstances. Thus, Mr. Price failed
to rebut the presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable.
Accordingly,
Mr. Price’s 24 month term of imprisonment was affirmed but the panel majority vacated
the 12 month term of supervised release and remanded the case for the imposition
of a new term of supervised release that did not exceed the maximum allowed by §3583(h).
In a
separate opinion, Judge Batchelder agreed with the majority that Mr. Price’s 24
month sentence was not substantively unreasonable. She would have joined the
majority’s ruling on Mr. Price’s procedural reasonableness challenge if the
issue were reviewed de novo but she dissented because in her view the error was
not “plain” or “obvious or clear.” Judge Batchelder noted that the
interpretation of §3583(h) is a matter first impression in the Sixth Circuit
and the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue. Under Sixth Circuit plain
error precedent Judge Batchelder viewed that as “fatal” to Mr. Price’s procedural
reasonableness challenge. (Concurring-Dissenting Op. at 9).
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