When is a Defendant Eligible for Resentencing under the First Step Act? Sixth Circuit Joins Sister Circuits in Issuing a Favorable Ruling.

Is a defendant's eligibility for resentencing under the First Step Act tied to his or her statute of conviction or the record of conviction as a whole? In United States v. Boulding, the Sixth Circuit joined its sister circuits in affirming the former.

A jury convicted Walter Boulding of one count of conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and one count of possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, Mr. Boulding's Final Presentence Report attributed substantially more crack cocaine (650.4 grams) to him, which subjected him to a mandatory life sentence because he had two prior felony drug convictions. The district court subsequently sentenced Mr. Boulding to life imprisonment on the first count and 360 months on the second count.

  

In 2018, Boulding moved the district court reduce his sentence pursuant to the First Step Act. Over the Government's objection, the district court imposed a reduced sentence of 324 months imprisonment on both counts, to be served concurrently. However, it denied Mr. Boulding's request for a de novo resentencing hearing and for an opportunity to object to his amended sentence. The Government and Mr. Boulding filed subsequent cross-appeals.

On appeal, the Government argued the district court erred finding Mr. Boulding eligible for resentencing under the FSA. Arguing that the phrase "the statutory penalties for which" modified not the nearest noun ("a Federal criminal statute") but the entire preceding phrase ("a violation of a Federal criminal statute"), the Government claimed the Act required the district court to look at the entire record of Mr. Boulding's conviction, which, considering the large quantity of crack cocaine attributed to him, made him ineligible for resentencing. The district court disagreed. Joining its sister circuits, the Court held that resentencing under the Act hinged upon the applicable "Federal criminal statute" and found that the district court correctly held Mr. Boulding was entitled to resentencing.

Turning to Mr. Boulding's second argument, the Court held that although Mr. Boulding was not entitled to a plenary resentencing hearing under the FSA, the Act provides defendants with an opportunity to present objections to any amended sentence imposed, although the sentencing court has the discretion to fashion the means by which they may lodge their objections. Since the district court did not permit Mr. Boulding an opportunity to present his objections to his amended sentence, the district court abused its discretion. Thus, the Court vacated the amended judgment and remanded Mr. Boulding's case for resentencing.