Giving Officers a Tour of Your Marijuana Grow Operation Constitutes Consent to Search

 In United States v. Blomquist, the Sixth Circuit held a search of the defendant's property that included an expansive marijuana grow operation did not violate the Fourth Amendment where the defendant voluntarily led them on a detailed tour of the grounds and discussed his operation with them at length. Officers arrived on Mr. Blomquist's father's property with a search warrant for the premises. They placed Mr. Blomquist in cuffs and Mirandized him. He agreed to talk, at which point he was uncuffed. He explained he was running a legal growing operation and took officers on a tour of his plants in a chicken coop and greenhouse, as well as a storage facility, answering all of their questions along the way.

Unfortunately, his operation was not legal. This was true for a variety of reasons including that the operation was too large to comply with Michigan law, Mr. Blomquist had a prior felony conviction that prohibited him from owning such an operation, and he admitted to police that he sold his product to a drug dealer (not a legitimate dispensary). At the trial level, Mr. Blomquist argued that officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant based on the expansive search conducted. However, the trial court found that Mr. Blomquist voluntarily consented to the search.

On appeal, Mr. Blomquist argued that the chicken coop and greenhouse were outside the scope of the search warrant, rendering the search illegal. The Sixth Circuit applied a two-factor evaluation of whether there was consent to a more expansive search: 1) whether an individual's actions adequately demonstrated consent, and 2) whether other factors contaminated that consent. As to the first factor, the Sixth Circuit held Mr. Blomquist's actions supported consent where he cooperated, volunteered information, and led officers around the property as they followed. As the Sixth Circuit characterized it, "Not only did Blomquist consent to the search, he practically directed it."

As to the second factor, the Sixth Circuit looked to the totality of the circumstances to assess whether other factors negatively impacted consent. While Mr. Blomquist argued that the officers' search warrant and his initial detention tainted his "consent," the Sixth Circuit pointed to his Miranda advisement, his cooperation from the moment officers arrived, and the lack of any evidence of duress or coercion as support that the consent was valid.