Sixth Circuit continues to curtail compassionate release

In 2018, the First Step Act expanded compassionate release to allow reductions in prison sentences when an incarcerated person showed "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." 18 U.S.C.§ 3582(c)(1)(a)(i). But despite this broad language, in a series of decisions the Sixth Circuit has curtailed what type of circumstances can fall within the ambit of "extraordinary and compelling."

The latest of those decisions came today in United States v. Roy West. In 2011, a federal judge sentenced West to die in prison after a jury convicted him of murder-for-hire conspiracy.  Notably, however, West's jury was not specifically asked whether the victim's death actually resulted from the murder-for-hire conspiracy—an important fact because it required a mandatory life without parole sentence.

In 2022, West moved for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(a)(i), arguing that his mandatory life sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) because the jury wasn't required to find that the death resulted from the conspiracy. And in fact, evidence at trial suggested multiple people sought to kill him, so it wasn't a foregone conclusion that he could have been killed by someone else. The district court agreed that West's sentence violated Apprendi and reduced his sentence, explaining that, in addition to the sentencing error, West has shown compelling rehabilitation and his sentence is disproportionate to others with similar conduct.

The Sixth Circuit found that, despite the substantial discretion given to district courts in ordering compassionate release, the reduction violated United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048, 1050 (6th Cir. 2022). In McCall, a divided en banc court weighed in on an ongoing circuit split to conclude that nonretroactive changes to the law cannot constitute "extraordinary and compelling" reasons for reduction under § 3582(c). Apprendi is retroactive, so West argued that McCall did not apply. But the court concluded that, in its view, West's argument still amounted to an "end run around" the restrictions on habeas relief.

Judge Gibbons dissented in McCall and wrote the majority decision here. She slipped in a reminder of her criticism of the Sixth Circuit's current approach to § 3582(c) in a footnote: "McCall's breadth is evident in its application here. A once highly discretionary decision of the district court, as broadly suggested by the Supreme Court in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), has been severely and categorically cabined."

For now, then, even if constitutional errors occurred in your sentencing, and you can show that the sentencing factors favor a sentence reduction, a district court can't (without more) use § 3582(c) to reduce your sentence. The plot may thicken if the Sentencing Commission's expansive new guidance about the application of the compassionate release statute takes effect in November of this year, or if the Supreme Court takes up the circuit split on the scope of § 3582(c).