A blog by federal public defenders and criminal defense lawyers practicing in the Sixth Circuit.
New Crack Amendments DO NOT apply to pending cases
In United States v. Carradine, 10a0305p.06 , issued on September 20, 2010, the Court determined that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which was enacted on August 3, 2010 lowering crack cocaine mandatory penalties, only applied to those defendants whose conduct occurred after the date of enactment. The Court, relying chiefly on 1 U.S.C. 109, found "The new law at issue here, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, contains no express statement that it is retroactive nor can we infer any such express intent from its plain language. Consequently, we must apply the penalty provision in place at the time Carradine committed the crime in question. We affirm the district court’s imposition of the 60-month mandatory minimum sentence."
The silver lining, if any, in this decision is that the Court did admit that the statute was amended, and not repealed. The Federal Public Defenders office for the Southern District of Ohio, which has this appeal in their appellate division, will be filing for en banc review.
No Title to Capture Truly Deplorable and Heinous Facts
Trying to catch up with our AFPDs' summaries. This case is truly horrible. Defendants were guards at a detention center. Interesting discussion of plain error, Apprendi, and other issues.
WESLEY LANHAM (08-6504; 09-5094);
SHAWN FREEMAN (08-6506; 09-5095),
Direct Appeal
Published
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/10a0261p-06.pdf
Defendant were convicted of violating an inmate’s civil rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and of making a false entry in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519. They were prison jailers when an inmate (J.S.) was raped in jail. Defendants and their supervisor decided to "scare" J.S. after the latter was arrested for a traffic violation. They placed him in a general population jail cell and incited atrocities. Defendants appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions, and Defendant Freeman claimed that he was entitled to a downward sentencing departure. The government appealed the district court’s application of the 2006 Sentencing Guidelines to the defendants’ sentences and the court's refusal to apply a sentencing enhancement to Defendant Lanham.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court sets of the facts of the offense in painful detail in the first 7 pages of the opinion. The conduct of these defendants was egregious.
The Circuit Court ruled that, although the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to exclude two jurors for cause, the error was harmless, as the jurors were struck peremptorily. The government’s striking of a third juror for cause was correctly allowed by the trial court. The panel was constitutionally acceptable.
The trial court’s limitation on the scope of cross-examination was reviewed for plain error where there was no preserved objection. Since there is no 6th Circuit case on point, the Court of Appeals looked to other circuits and found a split of authority. In that case, plain error cannot be found.
"Where there are conflicting authorities, the district court could not have committed plain error." Court found that, at a minimum, a court of appeals cannot correct an error unless that error is clear under current law. Because the law on the issue was not clear, the district court did not commit plain error.
There was sufficient evidence as to each defendant to convict each of violating the inmate’s civil rights. As to filing false reports, the wilful omission of facts is sufficient falsification to be a crime.
The enhancement under the statute was properly submitted to the jury. The defendants were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 241 for conspiring to violate J.S.’s civil rights. The indictment charged that the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy included aggravated sexual abuse; the statute establishes a ten year maximum sentence for those convicted under the statute. But it includes an increased penalty of "any term of years or for life" if the conspiracy included an act of aggravated sexual abuse.
Because the question of whether an act of sexual abuse occurred is a factual issue that increases the penalty for a violation of § 241 beyond the otherwise prescribed statutory maximum, the question had to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The district court properly submitted the question of whether aggravated sexual abuse occurred to the jury, and adopted the definition of aggravated sexual abuse found in 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (Court cites 1998 version).
The sentence reduction for minimal was properly denied to Defendant Freeman.
The trial court’s use of the guidelines in effect at the time of the crimes was appropriate in the face of appeal by the government. Ex Post Facto concerns would have been implicated by use of a later version of the advisory guidelines and the trial court correctly recognized those concerns.
The trial court’s decision not to apply a leadership role to Defendant Lanham’s guideline scoring was appropriate and supported by the record.
The court sentenced Lanham to 180 months and Freeman to 168 months in prison.
July 21---Amish Tobacco

Just catching up a little. :) Thanks, AFPDs, for your summaries!
CHRISTOPHER SUTTON (08-6420) and RENNIE TURNER, (09-5049)
Direct Appeals
Unpublished
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/10a0447n-06.pdf
Defendant Christopher L. Sutton appealed his conviction for conspiracy to structure currency transactions to avoid reporting requirements (in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3)), and Sutton and his co-defendant Rennie Turner appealed their sentences. Rennie Turner pleaded guilty prior to trial and appealed the reasonableness of his sentence. Sutton went to trial and was convicted before a jury with two other co-defendants. On appeal, he argued that 1) the government presented insufficient evidence on several key elements of the structuring statute, 2) his right to confront his accusers was violated, and 3) the district court violated his ex post facto clause rights by using the wrong Sentencing Guidelines edition. Court affirmed Sutton’s conviction and both defendants' sentences.The convictions in this case arose from an expansive scheme to illegally traffic in tobacco from 1998 to 2003.The conspirators had sought to profit from sales of "excess tobacco." The plan included selling tobacco grown on another farm with a card as if it were grown on the designated farm, selling above a quota amount, and falsely designating tobacco. The conspirators made cash purchases of tobacco in Pennsylvania, a non-quota state, of Pennsylvania-type tobacco, mainly from Amish and Mennonite farmers. This tobacco was shipped to Tennessee and Kentucky and passed off as burley tobacco that had been grown in compliance with the burley-tobacco allotment program (in some years, non-quota tobacco from Pennsylvania and Maryland was identical or almost identical to Kentucky and Tennessee quota tobacco).To get the funds necessary for this operation, the co-conspirators structured financial transactions. Sutton and Robert D. Oldham were the leaders, and Sutton generally provided the funds to be structured.
Most of the defendants, including Rennie Turner, decided to plead guilty.The jury found Sutton and Ron Bowen guilty; it found Joey Bowen not guilty. The district court sentenced Sutton to 60 months, the statutory max. The district court also awarded the government a forfeiture amount of $4,500,000, to be paid by Sutton. The court sentenced Rennie Turner to 51 months. Turner appealed the reasonableness of his sentence of 51 months. He did not appeal the calculation of his offense level as 24 or his criminal history category as I. Rather, he argued that the district court failed to adequately consider mitigating circumstances and considered an impermissible factor.As to Sutton, the evidence was found to be sufficient.
The evidence presented did not violate the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. Neither the tape recordings nor a co-defendant’s statement violated the confrontation clause. The tapes were not testimonial and the co-defendant testified at trial and therefore the trial court’s failure to ask defense counsel if he wanted to cross-ex the witness was not error where counsel failed to object to the opportunity.
The trial court used the correct guideline version in sentencing the defendant by using the most current edition, even though some of the offense conduct predated the version of the guidelines used. Regardless, the Court found that the advisory range would have been the same.
Turner’s within-guidelines sentence was reasonable even though he was denied acceptance of responsibility and the court did not grant a variance from that range. The record supported both decisions.