Showing posts with label Guilty Plea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Guilty Plea. Show all posts

Supreme Court Reverses Sixth Circuit: Amended Crack Guideline Relief Is (Probably) Available in (C) Pleas

Yesterday, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit in Freeman v. United States, holding that Petitioner William Freeman could move for a sentence reduction because of retroactive amendments to the crack guidelines.

In United States v. Goins, 355 Fed. App'x 1 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2009), the Sixth Circuit (Boggs, Rogers, White) had found that Freeman was not eligible for a sentence reduction because he had plead guilty pursuant to an agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), known colloquially as a "(C) plea." In a (C) plea, the defendant and the prosecutor agree on a sentence and that sentence binds the court if the court accepts the plea.


William Freeman and his prosecutor had agreed in 2005 that Freeman would serve 106 months in prison for possession of crack cocaine and a firearm. The agreement recognized that Freeman's Guidelines range for the crack possession was 46-57 months. The court accepted the (C) plea.

Three years later, the Sentencing Commission issued a retroactive Guidelines amendment to attempt to remedy the crack/powder sentencing disparity. This amendment lowered Freeman's range on the crack count to 37-46 months. Freeman moved to have his sentence reduced under the proper the statutory mechanism. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that a sentence predicated upon a (C) plea was the result of a bargain between prosecution and defense, not the Guidelines. In a strong concurrence, however, Judge White argued that, were she not bound by precedent, she would remand the case with instructions to determine whether the original sentence was based on the Guidelines.

The Supreme Court ultimately vindicated Judge White. Four Justices (Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) found that defendants with (C) pleas can move for sentence reductions. Four Justices (Roberts, Alito, Thomas, and Scalia) held that they cannot. The controlling opinion, however, is Justice Sotomayor's currence. She pragmatically held that a petitioner with a (C) plea could move for a sentence reduction if his plea expressly used the now-amended Sentencing Guidelines range as part of the calculus of his sentence.

Reversal in CP Receipt case -- Inadequate Guilty Plea Failed to Distinguish Receipt v. Possession

In US v. Szymanski,a published decision issued today (available here), the Sixth Circuit reverses a CP receipt conviction and five-year (mandatory minimum) sentence, clarifying the difference between CP receipt and possession. Implicit in the ruling is that the Government cannot obtain a conviction for CP receipt merely by showing the presence of CP on a computer.

A week before oral argument, the Sixth Circuit sua sponte asked the parties to address the quantum of proof and whether the plea and conviction were proper.

The basis for the reversal is "Szymanski may have unknowingly pled to an offense—subjecting him to a mandatory minimum the district court sought not to impose—whose elements he did not understand and which he may not have committed." Because the "demanding scienter requirement" was not explained to the defendant during the brief guilty plea colloquy, the Sixth Circuit found the defendant "did not have an adequate understanding of the nature of the charge at issue." The case begins:

First, the Supreme Court [in United Statse v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994)] over sixteen years ago, construed the crime at issue to contain an element not necessarily required by its statutory text: a defendant charged with receipt of child pornography must have knowledge, not only as to the act of receipt itself, but also as to the fact that the material he is receiving features minors engaged in explicit sexual conduct. Second, this interpretation of the statute as containing a demanding scienter requirement was never explained to the defendant during the rather brief colloquy preceding the district court’s acceptance of his guilty plea. Indeed, our examination of the record leaves us with the strong impression that the defendant, his counsel, as well as government counsel at the arraignment did not have an adequate understanding of the nature of the charge at issue. Moreover, there is evidence that the defendant specifically denies having any knowledge at all with respect to the content of the material he was receiving at the time of receipt, the very element the Supreme Court held necessary for conviction under the receipt charge. Accordingly, we VACATE the defendant’s conviction and sentence, and REMAND the case for further proceedings.

The Court declined to find harmless error becuase the defendant denied knowing the material he received was CP at the time he received it, and the district court improperly believed CP possession and receipt to require the same elements.