Showing posts with label Speedy Trial. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Speedy Trial. Show all posts

Speedy-Trial Win!

Here's another big win from last week.

US v. Heshelman, Nos. 10-1049/1223 (6th Cir. April 12, 2013) (not for publication).

Panel of Judges Clay, Gibbons, and White. 

Dist ct said that an approximately three-year delay b/t indictment and trial not a speedy-trial violation.  COA reversed. 

Money laundering and fraud.

Indictment filed in 2006 (shortly before S of L expired) and was sealed, so gov could continue investigating.  But gov didn't do much---just kept a journal of the defendant's contacts with the alleged victims. 

Defendant one in Switzerland.  Issue with potential extradition.  Defendant got in touch with FBI agent b/c knew of investigation, which was hampering his business.  Agent did not inform defendant of indictment, which had been filed at that point.  Gov finally requested extradition from Switzerland in 2009.  Trial commenced about four months later.  Jury convicted on all counts.

A second defendant was told by FBI of warrant for his arrest in '08; defendant said he wanted to cooperate.  Pleaded guilty about six months later.

First defendant complained of speedy-trial violation b/c of three-year delay in arrest and trial.  Second defendant complained b/c gov knew of his whereabouts, but decided not to proceed with his trial until first defendant arrested. 

Factors:

* Length of delay and defendant's assertion of rights.  Trial delay of a year or more generally presumed prejudicial and triggers consideration of other factors.  Gov conceded this presumption and that appellant asserted speedy-trial rights in timely manner. 

* Reason for delay.  Gov conceded it followed a "wait-and-see" course and sought to arrest the first defendant when the latter returned to the US to see family.  Extradition difficult and gov wanted complete control of prosecution.  But gov obligated to act diligently, even when a defendant is in a foreign country.  Here, actively seeking extradition would not have been futile: there was an extradition treaty with Switzerland.  Gov just didn't pursue extradition b/c didn't want Switzerland to place conditions on the extradition.  But gov made only one attempt to see what conditions might be.  Switzerland had been responsive.  But gov just waited for the defendant's return to the US.  Can't wait indefinitely.  Defendant didn't flee the jurisdiction to avoid the charges; he had lived in Switzerland before the alleged scheme began. 

* Prejudice.  Presumption here, and gov didn't rebut. 

First defendant's speedy-trial rights were violated.

As to second defendant:

* Gov could have arrested him at any time.  Gov conceded presumptive prejudice.  Also conceded timely assertion of rights. 

* Once indictment unsealed and warrant for arrest issued, defendant two turned himself in. 

* Gov also admitted that it delayed b/c if defendant two were tried alone he might prevail by just blaming defendant one.  Gov interest in trying alleged co-conspirators together does not automatically justify delay.  And gov did not delay while diligently searching for defendant one, as already discussed.  Gov was just delaying extradition of defendant one. 

Second defendant's speedy-trial rights violated. 

Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss indictment with prejudice. 

Concurrence by Judge Clay:

Agrees that speedy-trial rights violated.  Looks more closely at reason for delay.  What is standard of review?  Considerable deference, according to SCOTUS. . . .  Like clear-error review. 

3 Year Government Delay = Speedy Trial Violation

In United States v. Ferreira today, the Sixth Circuit held that a 35 month delay caused by gross government negligence in the face of the defendant’s pro se assertion of his speedy trial rights violated the defendant’s speedy trial rights and necessitated dismissing the indictment with prejudice. A previous published opinion said that 5 years was enough, a previous unpublished opinion said that 3 and a half years was enough and a previous published opinion said that 2 years was not enough. So the line is moving in the right direction.

The issue in this case was whether to apply a presumption of prejudice to a 35 month government delay. Speedy trial analysis is easy when the government acts in bad faith or the delay causes identifiable prejudice to the defendant (e.g. a key defense witness dies or exculpatory evidence is lost or destroyed). The problem is that in the real world, cases rarely involve such easy determinations. Instead, cases most often seem to involve government negligence combined with a fear of unidentifiable prejudice. As the Supreme Court put it, “time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony can rarely be shown.” In other words, how do you prove what a witness would have remembered had the trial happened five years ago? How do you prove what evidence the defense team might have turned up? The answer is that you have to presume prejudice when the delay is long enough, and in this Circuit, 35 months is apparently long enough, at least when the delay is solely the government’s fault.

The dissent takes issue with this test, correctly pointing out that it has turned into a numbers game where various circuits require anywhere from 2 to 5 years for the presumption. The dissent would require that “before applying the presumption, we should at least ask whether there is reason to believe that the defendant has suffered significant, albeit unidentifiable, prejudice as a result of the government’s delay in bringing him to trial.” What the dissent fails to explain is how a defendant could possibly present evidence of an unidentifiable fact.

Cert Grants and Issues to Preserve

Just a quick note on some issues to look for and recent grants of cert.

Sykes v. United States, 09--11311 (Sept. 28, 2010): Does fleeing police in a vehicle (under the Indiana fleeing-and-eluding statute) constitute a violent felony for ACCA purposes?

The Seventh Circuit held that fleeing police in a vehicle in violation of the Indiana statute was sufficiently similar to the ACCA's enumerated offenses to counts as a violent felony. United States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Tinklenberg, No. 09-1498 (Sept. 28, 2010): Is the time between the filing of a pretrial motion and its disposition automatically excluded from the deadline for starting trial under the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D)), or is it excluded only if the motion actually causes a postponement, or the expectation of a postponement, of the trial?

The Sixth Circuit interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) to mean time is excluded when pretrial motions are filed and pending if they could possibly cause any delay of trial. United States v. Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 2009).

Mr. Tinklenberg is represented by this blog's own Kevin Schad, Appellate Division, Office of the Federal Defender for the Southern District of Ohio.