Showing posts with label allocution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label allocution. Show all posts

Right to Allocution



United States v. Garcia-Robles, No. 09–1980 (6th Cir. May 10, 2011) (to be published). Panel of Judges Sutton, Griffin, and Bertelsman (E.D. Ky.). Opinion by Judge Griffin.


In Garcia-Robles, the Court held "that upon general remand, when a sentence has been vacated on direct appeal, the defendant is entitled to a resentencing hearing where he may exercise the right to be present and allocute." Slip op. at 6. The Court emphasized the right to allocute upon remand. Id. at 7. The Court expressed the importance of the right to allocute: the right to allocute at resentencing, "despite a defendant’s previous opportunity to allocute, is essential." Id. at 8. A failure to afford a defendant this right is not necessarily harmless error. Id. at 11.


The Garcia-Robles court attempted to distinguish the decision in United States v. Mosley, No. 09--2359 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 2011) (to be published) (discussed earlier in this blog), but the two cases seem to remain somewhat at odds. The Mosley panel included Judges Boggs, Moore, and Sutton. Judge Sutton, who was on the Garcia-Robles panel, wrote the Mosley opinion.


In Mosley, the panel took a narrower view of the right to allocution. While not addressing the government's contention that there is no right to allocution at a resentencing hearing for a limited remand, the court did decide that the defendant could not show prejudice.

Shooting Pepper Spray at a Person Without Justification, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224d(2) = "Crime of Violence"


(Shooting pepper spray into the air while running = bad idea.)
In United States v. Mosley, 09-2359 (Mar. 29, 2011), the Sixth Circuit found that a misdemeanor conviction for shooting pepper spray at a person without justification in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224d(2) necessarily constitutes a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.2(a) and 2K2.1(a).
The defendant argued that the Michigan pepper spray statute would appear to encompass conduct involving only "a low concentration of chemicals," and thus might not "involve conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury." Focusing on "the ordinary case," however, the court concluded that "it is hard to imagine" a case in which pepper spray would be only mildly annoying, since "[t]he idea . . . is not to produce a slight irritant to a mugger or a bear; it is to stop them both in their tracks by incapacitating them." Because the statute "involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another," it falls within the "residual clause" of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) and meets the definition of a "crime of violence."
The court further declined to apply the "carve out for misdemeanor convictions" found in 18 U.S.C. § 921. While Section 921 expressly excludes crimes defined under state law as misdemeanors, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B), this exemption applies by its terms only "as used in" the statute, and the Guidelines contain no comparable language. Thus, "while there are many parallels between 'violent felon[ies]' under the statute and 'crimes of violence' under the guideline, this is not one of them."
Lastly, the court found that the district court's failure to invite the defendant to speak at his re-sentencing after remand was not prejudicial because the defendant had previously spoken at his initial sentencing hearing and because "[a]llocution is not designed to allow defendants to re-argue their lawyers' legal positions, and, . . . that is all Mosley wished to do here . . . ."