A blog by federal public defenders and criminal defense lawyers practicing in the Sixth Circuit.
No stay of execution for Reginald Brooks
Those of you who do capital habeas work will recognize the ruling as a fairly standard walk through 60(b)(6) issues. Those of you who, like me, are unfamiliar with capital habeas work should give it a look just to get a succinct description of the standards for stays of execution and review of habeas petitions in cases where a habeas petition has previously been filed and ruled upon.
What it all boils down to is this: a petition needs to be timely. It cannot relitigate issues already decided ("law of the case"). 60(b) is used to correct procedural errors in the appeal, not litigate the merits of the appeal. Ineffective assistance of habeas counsel cannot be raised in a 60(b) petition.
Props to Alan Rossman of the Federal Defender in Cleveland, Ohio, and Michael Benza for their continued efforts to keep Mr. Brooks alive.
Where is the AEDPA line? -- Wherever they want it to be
Tibbets applied for a writ of habeas corpus from Ohio death row arguing that his trial counsel botched the sentencing hearing by failing to put on powerful evidence of Tibbets' miserable, abuse-filled childhood and substance abuse. Judge Moore found this argument compelling and dissented.
The majority focused on the one-two punch of the Strickland and AEDPA standards: "Even if we were to conclude that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that a reasonable probability exists that, but for that failure, the result of the proceeding would have been different, we must still ask whether the state court's conclusion to the contrary was 'objectively unreasonable.'" With that standard as the starting point, Tibbets was fortunate to get seven more pages of attention, even if one of them was devoted to detailing the brutality of his crime.
In sum, the majority cited AEDPA and washed its hands of the case. The dissent effectively sidestepped AEDPA and dirtied its hands with Ohio's mess. AEDPA continues to be a most fungible statute, the application of which is always subordinate to a judge's other inclinations.
More IAC---Trial in an Hour, Anyone?

Fuller v. Sherry, No. 09--2147 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 2010) (unpublished). Panel of Judges Boggs, McKeague, and Quist (W.D. Mich.).
Petitioner was appointed new defense counsel one hour and twenty-eight minutes before jury selection began in his state case. He argued in this habeas case that he was entitled to a presumption that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective: "it is unlikely that any attorney could provide competent representation with so little preparation time." The Count found, however, that the presumption of ineffectiveness is limited to particularly egregious circumstances, and because the petitioner's "case was fairly straightforward, and witnesses and evidence had been identified by his previous counsel, we decline to apply the presumption and affirm the denial of [the petitioner's] petition."
State charges were resisting and obstructing an officer, CSC 4, and possession of marijuana. Petitioner requested new counsel on the day of trial and the court appointed another attorney present in the courtroom on another matter.
During a lunch break, the new attorney requested an adjournment and relayed to the court a number of requests petitioner had made, including requests for discovery of the criminal history of the witnesses, funds for a private investigator, a motion filed regarding the prior conduct of a complaining officer, and videotapes of the store, jail, and police vehicle. Petitioner also sought two additional witnesses: a police detective and the owner of the store at which the offenses allegedly occurred. The attorney admitted that she did not know the purpose of some of the requests; she made a motion in limine to exclude evidence that the petitioner was on parole, which was granted; and she informed the court that the petitioner was notified of a plea offer. The court recessed for an hour.
After this recess, the attorney asked the court for an adjournment, stating that b/c of the circumstances she had had no time to prepare. The petitioner also wanted an adjournment for other reasons. The court responded that none of the petitioner’s discovery motions had been filed properly and denied them. In response to the request for an adjournment, the court stated: that it was satisfied that counsel was competent and could provide "adequate representation"; counsel "was aware of jury trial, was preparing on another case for jury selection today. So I'm satisfied that counsel certainly was prepared for jury selection in this case"; and that there had "been a number of discovery requests that I really quite frankly don’t even understand how it would be logical, or relevant, or material, or admissible in this case." The court then asked, "Defense counsel ready?" and continued, "I’m ready to try the case. Bring in the jury, we’ll have opening statements."
As the Court of Appeals said, the issue was "whether, under Cronic, [the petitioner] is entitled to a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment."
The Supreme Court has identified three situations in which a defendant is entitled to a presumption of IAC (w/o resort to the Strickland test): 1) the "complete denial of counsel," including situations in which counsel was absent at a key stage of the proceedings; 2) situations in which counsel entirely fails to subject the government’s case to meaningful adversarial testing; and 3) situations in which the likelihood that any lawyer, even a completely competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is warranted.
Under this third Cronic category, the presumption of prejudice applies in "limited, egregious circumstances." The presumption is warranted "only when surrounding circumstances justify" its application, not just because counsel was appointed belatedly and the court refused to grant additional preparation time. There are five factors relevant to evaluation of counsel’s effectiveness in a given case (Cronic did not say that all of the criteria are required or that the criteria are exclusive):
1) time afforded for investigation and preparation;
2) experience of counsel;
3) gravity of the charges;
4) complexity of any possible defenses; and
5) accessibility of witnesses.
If the presumption is to apply, analysis of the criteria must show that counsel failed to function in any meaningful sense as the prosecution’s adversary. Otherwise, a defendant must be able to point to specific errors by his or her attorney to make out an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland.
Analysis of Factors:
Although the short period of time allowed for counsel to prepare was "indeed striking," tardy appointment of counsel alone does not warrant application of the per se rule. And the petitioner was never completely without the aid of counsel. The Court noted that the new attorney may not have had an opportunity to actually consult with the old attorney whom she replaced, so it would be improper to conclude that she benefited from all of the prior attorney’s trial preparation. She had to rely on her brief conversation with the petitioner, police reports, and the transcript of the preliminary exam. But, the Court found, given that the witnesses and evidence had already been identified and the preliminary examination transcript suggested the witnesses’ likely testimony, the nature of the case was largely established when the new attorney took over. She did not have to go to trial completely unprepared.
And she was an experienced criminal attorney. While the petitioner received a lengthy sentence, this sentence was based more on his status as a habitual offender than on the gravity of the charges he faced. As the prior attorney had been responsible for investigating the case, the relevant witnesses had been identified and prepared for trial before the new attorney was appointed.
The Court recognized that in some circumstances appointing new defense counsel on the day of trial may "so damage the integrity of a criminal trial that a presumption of ineffectiveness would be justified," but the Court found that that was not so here. Because the case was "fairly straightforward," and witnesses and evidence had been identified beforehand, it was possible for this experienced criminal attorney to provide an effective defense, even if she had little time to speak with her client or review discovery materials.
The Court affirmed denial of habeas relief.
Appellate Waivers and IAC
2255 case.
District court denied the 2255. Claim was IAC: failure to file notice of appeal. Petitioner claimed he'd requested an appeal. Petitioner also claimed IAC for counsel's failure to argue properly against certain guideline enhancements.
Court of Appeals remanded for evidentiary hearing.
Petitioner's plea agreement had broad appellate waiver. But when the court explained the provisions during the plea hearing, the court misspoke. The court told the petitioner he would be able to challenge certain potential GL enhancements on appeal if the sentencing court applied them. Neither party objected to the explanation of these appellate rights.
The sentencing court applied the enhancements, but granted a downward variance. No direct appeal filed. Petitioner filed pro se 2255. District ct denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Rule re Hearings: Petitioners are entitled to prompt hearings unless unless record is clear that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Burden for establishing entitlement is relatively light.
Rule on IAC and Appeals: Duty to file if client requests. Counsel may have duty to consult, even if client has not requested an appeal.
Issue 1: Petitioner argued that it's IAC to fail to file a notice of appeal and/or consult re an appeal even if there's an appellate waiver. Circuit split on issue. Court decides not to weigh in b/c the Court rules in the petitioner's favor on Issue 2.
Issue 2: Petitioner did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal. While statements by a court cannot supercede the terms of a plea agreement, the plea-taking court here misstated the terms of the waiver before the plea was accepted. When a defendant misunderstands the terms of a plea agreement based on statements by the court, the waiver is not knowing and voluntary. The court said that the petitioner retained the right to appeal, so his waiver of this right was not knowing and voluntary.
Because petitioner retained his right to appeal, he had a right to have his attorney file the notice of appeal.
District court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the petitioner instructed his attorney to appeal. If the petitioner instructed his attorney to file a notice of appeal and the attorney failed to do so, the attorney was per se ineffective and petitioner would be entitled to a delayed appeal.
A strong warning from the Court: make sure you file your motions even if you think a plea may occur
On appeal, defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in not allowing him to file a motion to suppress. The Court first provided a definition of "good cause", stating "
Good cause is a flexible standard heavily dependent on the facts of the particular case as found and weighed by the district court in its equitable discretion. At a minimum, it requires the party seeking a waiver to articulate some legitimate explanation for the failure to timely file."
The Court then found that "if the failure to timely file occurred as a result of a lawyer’s
conscious decision not to file a pretrial motion before the deadline, the party seeking a
waiver will not be able to establish good cause." The Court found that under the facts of the case, counsel's decision not to timely preserve a suppression issue was on the defense, and could not provide "good cause" for an untimely motion.
The moral of the story? Make sure you get an extension on the motions deadline, or file the motion to preserve the claim!
Michigan court decisions citing Rule 6.508 do not constitute a "reasoned" decision

Yikes! Extremely Sad Story of "Justice"

Wilson v. Rees, No. 09--6306 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 2010). Petition for rehearing en banc denied, but Judge Martin offers a chilling dissent. He writes "to highlight this particularly ugly example of why 'the death penalty in this country is arbitrary, biased, and so fundamentally flawed at its very core that it is beyond repair.'"
This case, explains Judge Martin, involved a scandal that "is an embarrassment to all segments of the judiciary, from the judge who violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by having a sexual relationship with a defendant to the court officers who broke their oath of office by ferrying this defendant to and from the judge’s chambers for sex." Judge Martin goes on, "When any trial is infiltrated by this sort of sordid corruption, it demeans our judicial system and undermines public confidence in its judgments. When a criminal defendant’s life is at stake, it is horrifying."
Judge Martin recounts how "the defense in this case began with a handwritten note begging for volunteers, and ended with Wilson clumsily attempting to defend himself because he lacked competent counsel." Judge Marin reflects on
Gideon v. Wainwright and its admonition:From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis
on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals
in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
Judge Martin finds that "[n]early half a century after Gideon
, its promise remains unfulfilled. Capital defendants like Wilson are routinely appointed counsel without the experience, skill, or commitment to adequately represent them. Much of the arbitrary and discriminatory nature of our current death penalty stems from the fact that quality of representation is the single greatest factor in determining when it is applied."Judge Martin closes, "When a person is sentenced to death in a kangaroo court such as Wilson’s, with an illicit sexual affair taking place between a co-defendant and a colleague of the trial judge and no semblance of qualified defense counsel, it irreparably tarnishes our legal system. Until we reform this broken system, we cannot rely on it to determine life and death."
A blip or a storm?

Yesterday, the Court issued a published decision in the case of Cvijetinovic v. Eberlin. Case No. 08-3629 http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/10a0256p-06.pdf
The holding of the case is somewhat unremarkable (counsel not ineffective for failing to anticipate Blakely and state court precedent applying Apprendi); however, the dicta regarding the futility doctrine bears review. The defendant had argued that he was excused from raising an Apprendi claim on direct review, as the state courts had consistently held that Apprendi did not apply to Ohio sentencing schemes. The Court, in rejecting this claim, eliminated, or at least gutted, the futility doctrine to excuse procedural default. The Court noted that "the alignment of the circuits against a particular legal argument
does not equate to cause for procedurally defaulting it."
The Court recognized that, in holding in this fashion, it was inviting (and apparently requiring) counsel to raise all issues, in all cases, no matter how frivolous they may seem at the time in light of then existing law. The Court admitted "this rule could, under certain circumstances, lead to some potentially undesirable results. One jurist predicted that 'defense counsel will have no choice but to file one ‘kitchen sink’ brief after another, raising even the most fanciful defenses that could be imagined based on long-term logical implications from existing precedents.' United States v. Smith, 250 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). However, '[u]nless and until the Supreme Court overrules its decisions that futility cannot be cause, laments about those decisions forcing defense counsel to file ‘kitchen sink’ briefs in order to avoid procedural bars are beside the point.'”
So readers, what do you think? Are attorneys now tasked with filing "kitchen sink" briefs in all cases in order to preserve any and all claims, no matter how futile they may seem, until there is a Supreme Court ruling on the issue?
Restitution

MARTIN T.WILLIAMS
Direct Appeal
Published
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/10a0204p-06.pdf
A jury convicted the defendant on five counts of fraudulently overbilling Medicare, Medicaid, and several private insurance companies as an employee of a psychiatric medical practice. The district court sentenced the defendant to 12 months of probation and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $822,459.21. The defendant appealed his conviction, as well as the amount of restitution that he was ordered to pay. He also brought a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Appellate court affirmed the portion of the district court’s judgment relating to the conviction, but dismissed without prejudice the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, vacated the portion of the district court’s judgment that concerned restitution, and remanded the restitution issue for further consideration.
The Court issued a fairly lengthy opinion, which included a long recitation of a complicated procedural history. Ultimately, it was decided that the ‘deliberate ignorance’ instruction did not conflict with the ‘specific intent’ instruction on the conspiracy charge.
The Court declined to consider the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument as not ripe. The Court found that the restitution issue had its own complicated procedural history with much blame going to the government’s actions in this regard. It ruled, however, that the doctrine of equitable estoppel could not overcome the mandatory nature of the statute on restitution ’requiring’ the Court to order restitution in the proper amount. The Court also ruled that the district court had failed to comply with Rule 32 by not specifically addressing the defendant’s restitution objections.
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