Showing posts with label Motion to Suppress. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Motion to Suppress. Show all posts

Seventh Circuit on GPS

Following up on the post below, I think it is worth noting that the Seventh Circuit remains undecided on the GPS good-faith issue.  United States v. Brown, No. 11-1565, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4076, at *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 2014).

United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2013), the once helpful Third Circuit case, is up for rehearing en banc on May 28, 2014. 

I think we can expect to hear of cert petitions going up. . . .  We just have to stay tuned.   

In Which Judges Learn That There Is No Good Analogy for the Internet

Timothy Ryan Richards was an internet porn king. He operated at least a dozen websites pulling in a reported $60,000 per year. Unfortunately, these sites contained child pornography. In United States v. Richards, published yesterday, the Sixth Circuit affirmed his sixteen-year sentence.

The opinion deals primarily with the (over?)breadth of the search warrant. The FBI narrowed its investigation to one server in California: cabinet 200.02, server number 4, at the BlackSun facility in Los Angeles, California. The warrant permitted a search of the entire server. In addition to Richards' websites, server number 4 might have contained the information for any other number of sites. On the other hand, Richards could have mislabeled his directories.

Judges Griffin and Siler agreed that narrowing the search to one server was particular enough. Judge Moore disagreed and found the warrant overbroad. Judge Moore would have required the warrant to be limited to specific directories and the server's unallocated space.

What is abundantly clear from this opinion is that our law is ill-equipped for the internet age. In order to find familiar ground and invoke precedent, the Judges grapple for the best analogy. Maybe servers are like file cabinets. Maybe they are like drawers in file cabinets. Maybe they are like apartment buildings and the administrator is like a landlord. Maybe the unallocated space is like a common area -- but what if the bike is locked to the radiator?

Both opinions have real problems because, in the end, the internet is not like anything else. The majority points out a seemingly irreconcilable problem. Computers hold so much personal and private information that they should receive extra Fourth Amendment protection. But criminals can hide, mislabel and manipulate files such that there is no way to find anything without a broad search.

There will no doubt be much development in this area of the law. But for now, in this circuit, a warrant to search one (1) whole server is good enough.

Four New Supreme Court Decisions

Yesterday, the Supreme Court issued opinions in four criminal cases:

In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court has broadened use of the Miranda warning for suspects, extending it to children questioned by police in school. By a 5-to-4 vote, the court said for the first time that age must be considered in determining whether a suspect is aware of his or her rights.

In Tapia v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a federal judge cannot impose a longer prison sentence than what the sentencing guidelines permit simply to promote rehabilitation.

In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an Alabama man by a vote of 7-2, though the justices agreed the search that produced the incriminating evidence was illegal. The Court refused to disturb the firearm conviction, declaring that at the time the search was conducted, police relied in good faith on existing law.

In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that citizens, not just states, has standing to challenge the validity of the statute (federal laws implementing the chemical weapons treaty) on the ground that it infringes on the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.

NPR Online also offers commentary on the opinions.

Later Discovery of an Outstanding Arrest Warrant Does Not Remove Taint from an Illegal Stop

In United States v. Gross, the Sixth Circuit amends an earlier published opinion, United States v. Gross, 624 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. October 19, 2010). The Gross case is the second to involve the same officer blocking a legally-parked car in a high-crime area to detain the occupants.

Easily finding the officer made an illegal stop, the Sixth Circuit held that the subsequent discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant does not dissipate the taint of an illegal stop. The amended opinion does not change this holding.

The amended opinion, at page 15, adds two paragraphs in response to the dissenting opinion. The dissent argued that the observation of an open container in the car (after the police blocked the car and approached the vehicle) sufficiently attenuated the evidence from the illegal stop. The majority amended its opinion to address this specific argument, pointing out that the open container itself was a fruit of the illegal stop and not a "new, distinct crime."

The dissenting opinion of Gibbons is also amended to remove part B of the original dissenting opinion and replacing it with a short paragraph at the beginning of the dissenting opinion.

4th Am and Tech: Interesting Post

Everyone should check out this post by Steve Sady, Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR, on the 9th Cir. blog.

Mr. Sady discusses the evolving area of technology and 4th Amendment jurisprudence. Electronic surveillance, cell-site data, e-mail monitoring, and other forms of technological intrusions into privacy are critical, cutting-edge topics we need to be aware of and ready to address.

http://circuit9.blogspot.com/2010/11/judge-smith-fourth-amendment-and.html

A strong warning from the Court: make sure you file your motions even if you think a plea may occur

Today the Court issued a decision in United States v. Walden. 10a0354p.06 The defendant (and defense counsel) in Walden were pursuing a plea agreement, and as a result, let a motions deadline pass. The defendant did plea, however, when things did not go as planned, he withdrew his plea. He then asked for time to file a motion to suppress, which was denied. The defendant went to trial, and received a life sentence.

On appeal, defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in not allowing him to file a motion to suppress. The Court first provided a definition of "good cause", stating "
Good cause is a flexible standard heavily dependent on the facts of the particular case as found and weighed by the district court in its equitable discretion. At a minimum, it requires the party seeking a waiver to articulate some legitimate explanation for the failure to timely file."


The Court then found that "if the failure to timely file occurred as a result of a lawyer’s
conscious decision not to file a pretrial motion before the deadline, the party seeking a
waiver will not be able to establish good cause."
The Court found that under the facts of the case, counsel's decision not to timely preserve a suppression issue was on the defense, and could not provide "good cause" for an untimely motion.


The moral of the story? Make sure you get an extension on the motions deadline, or file the motion to preserve the claim!

Suppression Decision Worth a Read---Evidence Suppressed


United States v. Domenech, Nos. 08--1220 & 1221 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2010) (published). Judges Cook and Griffin in majority. Judge Norris dissented.

The defendants, two brothers, appealed their convictions for multiple firearm and drug offenses. Court found the brothers' legitimate expectation of privacy entitled them to suppression of certain inculpating evidence and reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.
Facts:
* Man calling himself simply "Rogelio" rented two rooms at motel.
* Officers noted "suspicious activity" in one of the rooms and approached it.
* Two officers knocked on door while another went behind the building and stationed himself behind the frosted bathroom window of the motel room in question.
* Officer by bathroom window saw the lights go on and a figure enter the bathroom and lean over. The frosting on the window prevented the officer from seeing the person or any fixtures in the room.
* Expecting the figure to be disposing of evidence, the officer opened the bathroom window and swung his flashlight at one of the defendants.
* Commotion prompted the officers at the room's front door to burst into the room.
* Officers found the defendants, two women, drugs, guns, and counterfeit money.

State Proceedings:
* State court suppressed the evidence.
* Federal charges then brought.
Federal Suppression Motion:
* Defendants jointly moved to suppress the evidence.
* At hearing, government focused on the defendants' expectation of privacy.
* District court denied motion to suppress, finding the brothers lacked an expectation of privacy in the motel room, as they failed to show that they were the registrants or that they were sharing the room with the registrant.
* Defendants went to trial. At trial, one of the women testified that one of the brothers paid for the rooms and had directed Rogelio to rent the rooms for the group. The brothers were in a state of undress at the time of the officers' entry, had keys to the rooms, and had luggage in the rooms.

Appellate Opinion:
* Government conceded that the defendants had a subjective expectation of privacy in the room, but argued that the expectation was not objectively reasonable because of the criminal activity conducted in the rooms, the use of an agent to rent the rooms, and the agent's use of an alias.
* Court rejected idea that criminality undermines privacy expectations.
* Use of agent to rent rooms did not defeat a legally cognizable expectation of privacy.
* Use of alias by agent did not defeat reasonable expectation of privacy.
* "The Domenech brothers demonstrated lawful control/possession with evidence that they procured the room for their own use through their agent, paid for the room, possessed the key to the room, and occupied it both physically and with belongings."
* Use of an invalid motel registration did not defeat the reasonable expectation of privacy. "Because the Domenech brothers exercised control over Room 22 with this de facto permission of the motel, their lawful possession/control legitimizes their expectation of privacy, even if diminished by their agent’s use of an alias."
* The one brother had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the other brother's room b/c the first brother paid for the room, had personal belongings in the room, and held a key to the room.
* Exigent circumstances did not justify the search. Officers must have reasonably believed that the room's occupants were likely to destroy evidence.
* "Because the trooper could not see through the frosted window, the district court correctly held that he lacked probable cause to believe that the defendant would destroy evidence of a drug crime. Without probable cause, the officers cannot rely on exigent circumstances to justify this warrantless search."

Dissent:
* "This is not a case where appellants, acting on their own behalf used an alias to register as hotel guests. Instead, the appellants instructed a third party to rent a motel room under an assumed name (purportedly for his own use) where they could conduct illegal activity. While defendants had a subjective expectation of privacy, I am unconvinced that they have met their burden to establish that society would recognize that their expectation as legitimate when viewed 'in light of all of the surrounding circumstances.'"

This Just In!!!!! Sixth Circuit finds police CANNOT enter private residence without permission or probable cause!!!



On September 2, 2010, the Court found suppressible evidence obtained where police officers, without a warrant, probable cause, or permission entered a private building by kicking in the back door. In United States v. Kimber, 10a0583n.06, officers, on routine patrol, came upon a private apartment building, which they knew in general was a "hot spot" for criminal activity. The building was protected by a keyed entry system. Officers did not have key access; however, undeterred, officers forced the back door of the property open. After entering the lobby area, the defendant, Mr. Kimber, entered the building, using a valid key. Upon seeing the officers, he turned around to leave; however, officers detained him, frisked him, and found a weapon.


In attempting to rationalize their breaking and entering of the building, officers contended that they had received from the owner of the building a "trespassing letter", which allowed them permission to be on the property. Unfortunately, the letter was dated two months after the defendant's arrest, and the letter did not cover forcible entry. Thus, the Court found this argument to be unavailing. The court also found unimpressive a letter dated two years previous to the arrest, as it was issued by a former owner of the property.


The Government also argued that because the rear door of the building was easily accessible by shoving or kicking the door, that the defendant (and presumably other tenants of the building) had no real reasonable expectation of privacy. The court disagreed with this position, finding "
the appropriate inquiry was not whether it was physically possible for an officer to gain entry, but rather, whether the tenant would have expected him to do so and whether society would regard such expectation as reasonable." The Court therefore reversed the decision of the district court, vacated the conditional plea, and remanded the case for suppression of the evidence as the entry to the property violative of the Fourth Amendment.


Nice to see that the Court still provides reasonable restrictions on police intrusions onto private property. Kudos to AFPD Jim Maus (Southern District of Ohio) on a job well done!






The day the Fourth Amendment Died

As Don McLean might say: "But february made me shiver With every paper I’d deliver.Bad news on the doorstep; I couldn’t take one more step. I can’t remember if I cried When I read about the decision inside, But something touched me deep inside The day the Fourth Amendment died."

In a published decision issued todayhttp://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/10a0276p-06.pdf, the Sixth Circuit provided two important rulings in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the Court determined that where a state court lacked jurisdiction, under state law, to issue a warrant, the warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. The magistrate in this case had issued a warrant for property located in one county, but the magistrate was from another county. Under Tennessee law, the magistrate only had jurisdiction in his sitting county. The Court therefore ruled "In this case, Judge Faris’ authority to issue warrants stems exclusively from Tennessee law, but that same source of law provides that Judge Faris had no authority to issue a warrant for a search of Defendant’s home. The search therefore violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights."

Unfortunately, the Court then determined that, even though there was a clear Fourth Amendment violation, there might not be a remedy. The Court, citing newer Supreme Court precedent, found that it needed to re-examine its good faith exception jurisprudence. The Court noted that, post Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009), the Court could not longer find that a presumption of suppression, based upon a Fourth Amendment violation, applied. Rather, a court must now balance the factors of (1) the benefits of deterrence against (2) the cost of excluding the evidence. The Court therefore remanded for the district court to consider this balancing test, but noted that "Arguably, the issuing magistrate’s lack of authority has no impact on police misconduct, if the officers mistakenly, but inadvertently, presented the warrant to an
incorrect magistrate.
"


The case thus presents a serious limitation on Fourth Amendment protections. In addition (and exclusive of) showing a Fourth Amendment violation, the defense must bear the burden of proving how the deterrent effect of suppressing the evidence would outweigh the cost of its exclusion in a particular case. Of course, the cost is presumably always going to be high; otherwise, why would exclusion be sought? Therefore, this case seems to present a significant hurdle for a successful Fourth Amendment challenge.

Can I Get a Whoo Hoo for Two Search-&-Seizure Wins



A very helpful AFPD in our office offers you:

Today, boys and girls, not one but TWO, count ’em, TWO, Motions to Suppress won by defendants and upheld on appeal. . . .

THOMAS W. WILLIAMS

Government Appeal

Published

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/10a0234p-06.pdf

On October 12, 2004, police pulled up in a police cruiser to a group of people standing outside an affordable-housing complex. They exited the vehicle and moved toward the group. An officer recognized one of the ppl in the group, the defendant, who was standing on the sidewalk and leaning against a car. The officer immediately told the defendant that the latter was "again trespassing" on the property. In the ensuing interaction, the defendant acknowledged in response to questions that there might be a warrant out for his arrest and that he had a gun. The officers arrested him; he was later charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

On the defendant's motion, the district court ruled that the defendant had been seized illegally, and the court suppressed the physical evidence and the defendant's statements. The government appealed, making three arguments: 1) the defendant was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the officer first spoke to him; 2) if he was seized, the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain him; and 3) even if the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him, the emergence of information that the defendant was wanted on an arrest warrant constituted an intervening circumstance that attenuated the taint of the unlawful seizure.

The court of appeals affirmed. The defendant was seized: a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave upon being approached by two uniformed officers in a marked car, singled out of a group, and immediately accused of a crime. The seizure was unlawful: the defendant was not trespassing or committing any other offense when the officers approached, and the fact that others in his group were drinking publicly and might have been trespassing did not constitute reasonable suspicion that the defendant had recently committed an offense or was about to do so. There was no attenuation: the defendant's statement about the outstanding warrant, made in response to a question posed by the officer at the outset of the seizure, was not a product of free will.

The incriminating evidence was obtained by exploitation of the illegality of the seizure---not by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.

The defendant was seized at the first contact with the police when they accused him of a crime (trespassing). A reasonable person would not have felt free to leave.

The police had no reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was violating the law or was about to violate the law when he was simply standing on a public sidewalk. The circuit court found that the proffered reasons by the government did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.

The statements by the defendant after his unlawful seizure and detention were not free of the taint of either when he made them. They were the fruit of those illegalities.

The totality of the circumstances, analyzed through the Brown factors, show that there was no attenuation of the connection between the officer’s unconstitutional seizure of the defendant and the incriminating evidence---the case called for a straightforward application of the exclusionary rule and the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. The incriminating evidence was obtained by exploitation of the illegality of the seizure and not through means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. The district court correctly suppressed the evidence.

The district court correctly determined that the officers seized the defendant without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Neither the officer's hunch that the defendant might have had an outstanding warrant nor the defendant’s statement ("I think I got one") purged the incriminating evidence of the taint of the illegal seizure.

*******

GARY MOORE

Government Appeal

Unpublished

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/10a0474n-06.pdf

The government appealed the district court’s grant of the defendant's motion to suppress crack-cocaine authorities found following a traffic stop. Defendant was charged with four drug-related charges, including conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and cocaine and two counts of distributing cocaine base. The district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress because the officers at the scene had no reasonable fear for their safety and did not have probable cause to effectuate a search incident to arrest. Appellate court affirmed.

The district court had rejected the officer’s claim that he was searching for weapons because the officer’s testimony that he suspected that the defendant was armed and dangerous was inconsistent with the facts. The district court correctly found that whatever reasonable concern for his safety the officer could articulate at the start of the stop dissipated during the nearly forty-three minutes he allowed the defendant to sit in the vehicle and stand along the roadside during the search.

The government did not contest this finding on appeal. And it was uncontested that there was no search or pat-down of the defendant during the forty-three minute interval the officers questioned the defendant and searched the vehicle.

As there was no Terry-stop search, the search was valid only if the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant had drugs at the time of the search. And there was no probable cause to search the defendant after a forty-minute traffic stop and vehicle search turned up nothing. Nothing the defendant did, before the attempt to search him a second time, gave rise to any probable cause. Even though, when the officers attempted the second search, the defendant tried to leave the area, this attempt to leave did not give the officers cause to search the defendant since the defendant’s actions were in direct response to the officers’ illegal second attempt to search.

The holding is two-fold. 1) The officer did not have probable cause to search the defendant’s person based on the tip that a similarly described vehicle might be transporting drugs and based on the defendant’s behavior before and during the search of the car. 2) The search of the defendant began in the absence of probable cause before he tried to flee. So, the officer did not have probable cause to search the defendant at the time the actual search began.

There was a dissent filed to this opinion. From the tone of the majority opinion and the tone of the dissent, one would surmise that this case provoked a ‘spirited’ discussion among the three judges.

*******

No Suppression---the Decor Was Telling



United States v. Hinojosa, No. 08–1393 (6th Cir. June 9, 2010) (published).

Bench trial. Defendant convicted of sexual exploitation of a child and CP charges. Appealed denial of motions to suppress evidence.

Issues:

* Were the police entry into his home and the arrest based on a non-existent warrant constitutional violations requiring suppression?

* Was uninvited and warrantless intrusion into the home (which enabled the police to observe evidence used to obtain a search warrant) a constitutional violation?

* Should evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant have been suppressed because of constitutional violations involved in obtaining the warrant?

Affirmed.

Background:

Defendant became a target in an international CP investigation. Undercover Canadian officials communicated with the defendant on-line; defendant claimed to have engaged in sexual activities with his 13-year-old daughter. Defendant transferred to the agents CP, including CP he claimed showed him and his daughter. ICE agents ran the defendant’s criminal history. LEIN and NCIC reports differed. LEIN report indicated an outstanding warrant.

Despite inconsistencies in the reports, officers went to defendant’s house to execute the outstanding warrant. Defendant’s then-wife answered the door. Officers requested permission to enter and she granted it. Officers followed the wife to the bedroom, found defendant, and arrested him (on the way, the officers recognized the decor from the videos). Defendant waived his Miranda rights and confessed.

At the evidentiary hearing and bench trial, the defendant did not let his attorney present evidence or argue. District court denied the motions to suppress, convicted the defendant, and sentenced him to 1,440 months.

Conclusions:

* Resolution of the issue of the non-existent warrant (it was for someone else) was unnecessary, because even assuming that the officers’ reliance on the warrant was unreasonable the defendant could not obtain relief. The officers had consent to enter the residence; the arrest warrant was not a prerequisite for the entry.

* Despite having the arrest warrant, the officers sought and received consent from the defendant’s wife prior to entering the residence, and again before proceeding from the entryway of the residence to the bedroom.

* Based on the totality of the encounter, the initial interrogation did not present a custodial environment such that Miranda warnings were required prior to questioning. The defendant’s pre-Miranda statements were properly included in the affidavit for the search warrant (executed later).

* At the time of the defendant’s arrest, the officers were aware of the information gathered prior to entering the residence and the corroborating facts learned while inside (e.g., the decor) and the defendant’s responses to their initial questioning. The district court correctly determined that probable cause to arrest the defendant existed independent of the mistaken arrest warrant.

* Following the valid arrest, the officers immediately advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, and he waived these rights. The defendant did not argue that this waiver was involuntary or coerced. So, these post-arrest statements were properly included in the affidavit for the later search warrant.

* The officers received consent to enter the house and to proceed down the hallway and into the bedroom. Everything that the officers observed was in plain view from their lawful position, so no constitutionally improper search occurred. The officers did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights by observing the decor of his residence, and those observations were properly included in the later search-warrant affidavit.

* Prior to entering the residence, the officers had established that: 1) videos and images involving child pornography were transferred to undercover agents from a specific IP address; 2) the IP address was registered to the defendant at a Lansing, Michigan, address; and 3) the defendant resided at that Lansing address. This evidence would have established the required "fair probability" that evidence of criminal activity would be found inside the defendant’s residence, and it would have justified the issuance of a search warrant.

* Defendant questioned why a search warrant was not initially sought by the agents if probable cause existed prior to the entry. The appellate court found, however, that the agents’ prudence in seeking a search warrant does not negate the existence of probable cause.

Suppression Depression



MYRON HUGHES

Direct Appeal

Published

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/10a0153p-06.pdf

Defendant was pulled over by Nashville police around 11:00 p.m. after officer observed the car standing for approximately three minutes at an L-shaped intersection in a deserted, high-crime, industrial neighborhood. The defendant was a convicted felon and admitted that he had been rolling a marijuana cigarette. Subsequent search of the vehicle produced a pistol and small amounts of marijuana, crack cocaine, and cocaine. Defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.

District court granted defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the car. It concluded that police lacked reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity and that police did not stop the defendant because of any alleged traffic violations.

Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded because the district court incorrectly focused on the officer's subjective intent. Remanded for consideration of whether, at the time of the stop, the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated a Nashville municipal ordinance. (An ordinance prohibits parking in such a way as to obstruct traffic.)

The majority, over a strong dissent that it found fairly reasonable, reversed and remanded the case for findings by the district court on several issues. The majority found that the district court, in part, relied on the officer’s subjective intent in making the traffic stop. The dissent concluded that the district court merely mentioned the intent issue in order to show that it recognized the objective fact that no traffic violation had occurred for which the officer might have had probable cause.