Showing posts with label Interrogations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Interrogations. Show all posts

Sixth Circuit reversed . . . again

On November 7, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Dixon v. Houck, in which the Court had overturned the conviction and death sentence of the defendant based upon Miranda violations.  The Supreme Court dealt unusually harshly with the Sixth Circuit in a per curium opinion, finding, for example, that  "according to the Sixth Circuit, the Miranda decision itself clearly established that police could not speak to Dixon on November 9, because on November 4 Dixon had refused to speak to police without his lawyer. That is plainly wrong." (emphasis added)  The Supreme Court dismissed each of the grounds for reversal set forth in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in short, order, and seemed to re-affirm the deference given to state court opinions, finding "Because no precedent of this Court required Ohio to do more, the Sixth Circuit was without authority to overturn the reasoned judgment of the State’s highest court."

The Supreme Court's opinion can be found here.

When does an informant become an agent?




Today, the Court issued a very helpful opinion in the case of Ayers v. Hudson. 10a0324p.06 The defendant in Ayers was charged with murder, and detained prior to trial. As so happens with many cases, he allegedly confessed to another inmate, who promptly cooperated with authorities against the defendant. Sound familiar? The twist in this case, however, was that after the inmate cooperated with authorities, he went back to the defendant, and obtained additional information. This additional information was used against him at trial, despite the defendant's claim that it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel.


The Court granted habeas relief, finding that the inmate's discussions with the defendant, after initial contact with investigators, violated the defendant's right to counsel. The Court determined that investigators armed the inmate with information, and that the inmate elicited, during a second interview with the defendant, information investigators were looking for to incriminate the defendant. The Court noted "Here, the 'combination of circumstances is sufficient to support the . . . determination' that the State intentionally created a situation likely to violate Ayers’ Sixth Amendment rights when it returned Hutchinson to Ayers’ jail pod and he thereafter deliberately elicited statements from Ayers regarding the murder weapon and the amount of money allegedly taken from Brown’s apartment."
The Court further held that whether or not investigators gave specific instruction to an inmate to elicit information was not determinative of this issue. The Court noted that "we hold that although direct written or oral instructions by the State to a jailhouse informant to obtain evidence from a defendant would be sufficient to demonstrate agency, it is not the only relevant factor. A court must also analyze the facts and circumstances of a particular case to determine whether there exists an express or implied agreement between the State and the informant at the time the elicitation took place that supports a finding of agency. To hold otherwise would
allow the State to accomplish 'with a wink and a nod' what it cannot do overtly
."
Kudos to the Cuyahoga County Public Defender's office on this significant win, and the precedent it creates!

July 8---Confessions



VERNELL D.WILLIAMS

Direct Appeal

Published

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/10a0194p-06.pdf

Defendant challenged his jury conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Court found claims "meritless" and affirmed.

Defendant argued that his 2005 confession to state police was involuntary and should not have been admitted at his federal trial. The voluntariness of a confession turns on a number of circumstances, including the length of the interrogation, its location, its continuity, the defendant’s maturity, education, physical condition, and mental health, and whether the police advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, and whether the record contains evidence of police coercion.

The circumstances of the defendant's confession did not show involuntariness.

Defendant also invoked a federal statute concerning confessions and delayed presentments: 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). Defendant claimed the district court had no right to admit his confession. Theory involved two steps: (1) The statutory provision says that "a confession" "shall not be inadmissible solely because" federal agents delay presentment to "a magistrate judge or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with" federal crimes if the confession "was made . . . within six hours immediately following . . . arrest"; and (2) confessions like this, which are made more than six hours after arrest and prior to presentment before a magistrate, must be involuntary.

Court rejected this two-step contention, finding at least three flaws. First, the statute creates a safe harbor for admitting, not excluding, confessions. Second, the statute regulates federal prosecutions and confessions, not confessions made in state custody. Defendant confessed while he was held by the state police for potential state charges. Third, the statute was designed to limit the requirement that federal agents promptly present a suspect to a federal magistrate, which has nothing to do (whether as a matter of state or federal custody) with this interrogation/confession.

Defendant went on to argue that, even if his confession was voluntary, the district court violated Rule 404(b) of the Rules of Evidence in admitting it. Rule 404(b) prohibits courts from admitting evidence of "other crimes," except for certain exceptions. The defendant's confession (detailing his ongoing drug sales, discussing how he obtained his drug supply, and admitting that he had been caught with five kilograms of cocaine in his car) was not evidence of other crimes. It was evidence of this, the charged, crime. While conspiracies may entail many acts, many of which may themselves be criminal, that does not make them "other crimes" presumptively barred from admission under 404(b).

The defendant argued that the evidence did not support the verdict. But the Court found that he had waived this argument by not renewing his pre-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the evidence. The Court had only to determine whether the trial resulted in a "manifest miscarriage of justice." The Court found that it did not.