Showing posts with label 3553(a) Factors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 3553(a) Factors. Show all posts

Habeas Fun for the Whole Family

Ajan v. United States, No. 09--6366 (6th Cir. Oct 3, 2013) (for publication).

Panel of Judges Keith, McKeague, and Watson (S.D. Ohio).

Drugs, aiding and abetting kidnapping, couple 924(c)s. . . .  646-month sentence.  2255 granted in part and denied in part by dist ct.  Dist ct entered amended judgment and new sentence without a resentencing hrg.  Petitioner did not seek a certificate of appealability (COA).  Petitioner appealed, arguing he was entitled to a resentencing hrg. 

Conclusions:
* No COA needed b/c petitioner appealing previously unreviewed issues.
* Ct of Appeals vacated amended judgment---dist ct to exercise its discretion in selecting a 2255 remedy.

Issues and Points:
* Whether a COA needed to appeal relief granted after a successful 2255 was an open questions in the circuit.
* Once a judgment is vacated under 2255, a district court must grant one of four remedies: 1) discharge the prisoner, 2) resentence the prisoner, 3) grant a new trial, or 4) correct the sentence.
* Here, successful 2255 led to a new judgment---the amended judgment---that was not in place at time 2255 filed. 
* Petitioner was essentially appealing a new sentence and did not need a COA.  Defendants entitled to direct review of sentences for non-constitutional errors.   
* In terms of the merits, ambiguity existed as to what the district court perceived as its statutory authority to grant 2255 relief.  So sentence vacated and case remanded.  (The parties had agreed that one 924(c) was not an offense under the charged statute; the dist ct vacated the conviction for that count and sentenced the petitioner to 346 months.  The dist ct essentially excised the unlawful sentence, but reinstated the others.)  Issue was: did the dist ct fully appreciate its discretion? 
* In terms of 924(c)s more broadly, Court of Appeals is clear: coexistence of a mandatory consecutive sentence does NOT remove a dist ct's discretion to resentence.  Dist cts have the authority to resentence after reversal of a 924(c).

This opinion is pretty interesting in terms of 2255 and resentencings.  The guidelines were mandatory when the petitioner was sentenced; now he gets the benefit of advisory GLs.  On remand, the dist ct can consider that the count with the longest sentence has been vacated, so the dist ct has "a far less egregious set of convictions" to consider on remand. 

Bad News on CP Sentencing

US v. Bistline, No. 10-3106 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 2012) (for publication).  Panel of Judges Gilman, Kethledge, and Ludington (E.D. Mich.).

CP case.  Recommended sentencing range under the GLs was 63 to 78 months.  Dist ct sentenced the defendant to one night in lockup + ten years of supervised release.  (Probation had recommended two years of custody.) 

Gov appealed, arguing substantive unreasonableness. 

COA agreed and vacated the sentence.

Background details:
* Defendant was 67 years old. 
* No criminal history.
* Had suffered two strokes and cared for his ailing wife. 
* Gov had argued for a GL sentence.
* Dist ct said the GLS were "seriously flawed" b/c of Congress's involvement in them.

Appellate Court's conclusions:
* GLs still initial benchmark.
* Justification for a variance must be "sufficiently compelling" to support the extent of the variance.  Cites Gall. 
* If a dist ct rejects the GLs, the COA "will 'scrutinize closely.'" 
* The Constitution "merely tolerates, rather than compels" Congress's delegation of power to the Sentencing Commission.  "Congress can marginalize the Commission all it wants . . . ."  Congressional involvement in the GLs (that may be politically motivated, rather than motivated by empirical study) is more a "constitutional virtue, rather than vice." 
* Congress's delegation of power to the Commission is a limited one.  The remainder is retained by Congress.
* The Court found that "it follows that a district court cannot reasonably reject [section] 2G2.2---or any other guidelines provision---merely on the ground that Congress exercised, rather than delegated, its power to set the policies reflected therein." 
* The district court need not agree with the GL with which Congress has played a role, but Congress's involvement "is not itself a valid reason to disagree with the guideline."
* To survive close scrutiny, a sentencing "court must explain its disagreement in terms that are persuasive on policy grounds, not political ones." 

Comparing Kimbrough:
* Yes, "the Commission did not act in its usual institutional role with respect to the relevant amendments to [section] 2G2.2.  But that is because Congress was the relevant actor with respect to those amendments; and that puts [section] 2G2.2 on stronger ground than the crack-cocaine guidelines were on in Kimbrough."
* Nothing in the Constitution "confines the exercise of Congress's sentencing power to empirical grounds alone." 
* CP GLs based on retribution and punishment, as well as other concerns.

3553(a) discussion:
* "Notably omitted" from the dist ct's discussion ("and virtually unpunished") was the offense of possessing CP.
* The Court concluded that collateral effects of a conviction/sentence like having to register as a sex offender do not satisfy the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense. 
* Gov provided a victim statement to which the COA looked. 
* The mitigating factors present could not justify the sentence.  Court cited United States v. Christman, 607 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 2010).
* Court concluded that the defendant had not expressed remorse and that the sentence "validated" the defendant's perceptions. 
* Court distinguished United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 2009).  Stall involved only plain-error review.  And government in Stall did not pursue the matter strongly.













United States v. Taylor: An Extra Dash of Pepper

Yesterday saw the publication of a significant case addressing subsection (g) of 18 U.S.C. § 3742, which addresses a district court’s treatment of the sentencing guidelines upon remand for resentencing. Judge Moore’s comprehensive opinion in United States v. Taylor, No. 09-1961 demonstrated a considerable understanding of both § 3742 and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Pepper v. United States, and gave some teeth to that opinion’s holding.

Taylor was originally convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, but prevailed on an appeal regarding a sentencing issue. On remand, Taylor argued that later versions of the sentencing guidelines would have lowered his guidelines range. At resentencing, however, the district court refused to consider subsequent amendments to the guidelines and instead used the guidelines as they existed at the time of the previous sentencing, as mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(1). Taylor appealed his resulting sentence as procedurally unreasonable.


In the recent Pepper opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed § 3742(g)(2), a separate but related provision requiring resentencing courts to impose only within-guidelines range sentences on remand except in limited circumstances. The Court in Pepper found that this mandate ran afoul of both § 3553(a) and § 3661 by impermissibly limiting the district court’s ability to consider any and all evidence in order to "sentence the defendant as he stands before the court on the day of sentencing." Taylor argued that this same rational should invalidate § 3742(g)(1).

The Sixth Circuit refused to find that § 3742(g)(1) should be invalidated along with § 3742(g)(2). Although the appeals court recognized that the provision was poorly worded and existed in considerable tension with both the guidelines and § 3553(a), it was not constitutionally invalid under Booker or the Sixth Amendment. This portion of the holding comes as a disappointment to sentencing reform advocates, who have long argued that § 3742(g)(1) should be invalidated.

The Taylor panel was not finished, however, and it went on to hold that the district court’s refusal to consider subsequent amendments was procedurally unreasonable. First, the panel rejected the district court’s rationale that using subsequent amendments could result in unfairness to one party or the other, noting that the Supreme Court had rejected this exact rationale in Pepper. Indeed, it was an abuse of discretion to rely on this "policy of fairness." The panel also recognized that § 3661 prohibits placing any limitation on the types of information a court can consider in sentencing a defendant. Likewise, the Sentencing Commission’s evolving view of the guidelines is "highly relevant" to the district court’s assessment of the "nature and circumstances of the offense" and the "seriousness of the offense" under § 3553(A). Ultimately, subsequent amendments bear directly on the district court’s primary role at sentencing: "to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to serve the purposes of sentencing. The opinion goes on to clarify that a district court is not required to agree with or apply the subsequent amendments, but that court cannot refuse to consider them.

Ultimately, Taylor simply upholds what by now ought to be beyond controversy: that a sentencing court’s duty is to impose an appropriate sentence that is (1) based on the unique characteristics of the crime and the individual and (2) not greater than necessary to serve the purposes of punishment. The opinion, however, demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit is still willing to take a close look at both congressional and Supreme Court mandates regarding sentencing.

Considering a sentencing memo requires more than just reading it

There have been few published opinions of note lately, but there is one unpublished opinion of interest issued today.



In United States v. Pizzino, No. 09-2146 (6th Cir. April 11, 2011), the Sixth Circuit vacates and remands a within-guidelines sentence of 180 months for distributing CP because the district court did not address non-frivolous arguments for lenience. For a district court to merely state it “received and understood a defendant’s sentencing memorandum” is insufficient and “does not fulfill its duty" under § 3553(a). The failure to consider the supporting evidence and the defendant’s circumstances was procedural error, particularly when the district court responded in detail to the prosecution’s arguments, but failed to address arguments of defense counsel.



In the sentencing memorandum, defense counsel presented several arguments for a lower sentence, including limited criminal history, low risk of recidivism, and the alternate sentences available, a statement from the defendant’s therapist, as well as the therapist’s notes, all of which highlighted progress and low risk of recidivism.



CP Guidelines are Presumptively Reasonable


In footnote seven, the Sixth Circuit notes many district court have expressed reservations about the child-pornography sections of the Guidelines being based solely on congressional mandates rather than empirical studies. However, the Sixth Circuit states the “presumption of reasonableness [of the Guidelines] attaches to all sentences within the Guidelines range; there is no ‘empirical evidence’ prerequisite.”

Pepper Decided!!!!! Good News!



You have probably already heard about the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pepper v. United States, No. 09–6822 (Mar. 2, 2011). But it's a great case and deserves noting here.

The Court decided that when a sentence has been set aside on appeal and a case remanded a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation and such evidence may support a downward variance.

Court discussed the role of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2), noting that § 3742(g)(2) restricts the discretion of a district court on remand by barring imposition of a sentence outside the guideline range except upon a ground of departure that was expressly used in the prior sentencing and upheld on appeal. Amicus contended that § 3742(g)(2) forecloses a resentencing court from considering evidence of a defendant’s postsentencing rehabilitation for purposes of imposing a non-guideline sentence, as such evidence did not exist at the time of the prior sentencing. But the Court found that "§ 3742(g)(2) is invalid after Booker."

Court pointed out that it abrogated 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) in Booker, and that its reasoning there applied to § 3742(g)(2) as well. Court found that "we see no general congressional policy reflected in § 3742(g)(2) to preclude resentencing courts from considering postsentencing information, that provision has no bearing on our analysis of whether § 3553(a) permits consideration of evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation."

Other things to consider:

Section 3742(g)(2) is akin to § 3742(g)(1), which says that the old GLs will apply at a resentencing. Pepper provides ammo to argue that the old GLs are not the GLs that should apply if the new ones are more favorable. (If they are less favorable, we have an ex post facto issue, but that's an issue to discuss at another time; courts have gone different ways on that issue.) The dissent makes this point very clear: "I agree with the Court that the decision below cannot be affirmed on the basis of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g) . . . . This provision was designed to function as part of the mandatory Guideline scheme . . . ." (Alito, J., dissenting). He just says (g)---no further subsection.

Now, for the Grant issue. (See the Jan. 18 entry on Grant.)

Does the Supreme Court implicitly sanction sentences below the mandatory minimum based on the defendant’s substantial assistance and post-sentencing rehabilitation? In Pepper, "safety valve" (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and guideline section 5C1.2) applied, which can be used to distinguish the case from a pure Grant situation. But Pepper still provides a sanction from the Supreme Court to use information beyond substantial assistance to sentence below a mandatory minimum.

Assisting the gov. is an aspect of obtaining "safety valve" relief from a mandatory minimum sentence. And the Court clarifies in Pepper that "‘It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the resentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.’"

Punishment should fit the defendant "and not merely the crime." Congress and the Sentencing Commission have "expressly preserved the traditional discretion of sentencing courts to ‘conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information [they] may consider, or the source from which it may come.’" While there are some constraints on sentencing courts’ discretion, once a mandatory minimum is released, a sentencing court should be able to consider a wide array of factors. . . .

Substantial-Assistance Departures


In June 2009, we got United States v. Grant, 567 F.3d 776 (6th Cir. 2009), in which Judges Keith and Merritt concluded that once a Rule 35 motion is made the district court can consider all of the 3553(a) factors---not just substantial assistance---in departing downward. Judge Gibbons dissented.

The majority said that "[o]nce the grip of the mandatory minimum sentence is broken, the sentencing judge may consider Sec. 3553(a)."

Unfortunately, on October 16, 2009, the Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacating the panel decision.

The case was reargued en banc on March 3, 2010. I'll try to keep you posted on the issue.