Showing posts with label 924(c). Show all posts
Showing posts with label 924(c). Show all posts

Habeas Fun for the Whole Family

Ajan v. United States, No. 09--6366 (6th Cir. Oct 3, 2013) (for publication).

Panel of Judges Keith, McKeague, and Watson (S.D. Ohio).

Drugs, aiding and abetting kidnapping, couple 924(c)s. . . .  646-month sentence.  2255 granted in part and denied in part by dist ct.  Dist ct entered amended judgment and new sentence without a resentencing hrg.  Petitioner did not seek a certificate of appealability (COA).  Petitioner appealed, arguing he was entitled to a resentencing hrg. 

Conclusions:
* No COA needed b/c petitioner appealing previously unreviewed issues.
* Ct of Appeals vacated amended judgment---dist ct to exercise its discretion in selecting a 2255 remedy.

Issues and Points:
* Whether a COA needed to appeal relief granted after a successful 2255 was an open questions in the circuit.
* Once a judgment is vacated under 2255, a district court must grant one of four remedies: 1) discharge the prisoner, 2) resentence the prisoner, 3) grant a new trial, or 4) correct the sentence.
* Here, successful 2255 led to a new judgment---the amended judgment---that was not in place at time 2255 filed. 
* Petitioner was essentially appealing a new sentence and did not need a COA.  Defendants entitled to direct review of sentences for non-constitutional errors.   
* In terms of the merits, ambiguity existed as to what the district court perceived as its statutory authority to grant 2255 relief.  So sentence vacated and case remanded.  (The parties had agreed that one 924(c) was not an offense under the charged statute; the dist ct vacated the conviction for that count and sentenced the petitioner to 346 months.  The dist ct essentially excised the unlawful sentence, but reinstated the others.)  Issue was: did the dist ct fully appreciate its discretion? 
* In terms of 924(c)s more broadly, Court of Appeals is clear: coexistence of a mandatory consecutive sentence does NOT remove a dist ct's discretion to resentence.  Dist cts have the authority to resentence after reversal of a 924(c).

This opinion is pretty interesting in terms of 2255 and resentencings.  The guidelines were mandatory when the petitioner was sentenced; now he gets the benefit of advisory GLs.  On remand, the dist ct can consider that the count with the longest sentence has been vacated, so the dist ct has "a far less egregious set of convictions" to consider on remand. 

Attention Appellate Attorneys: Read Plea Agreements Carefully!


United States v. Jones, No. 09-3970 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2011) (unpublished). In Jones, the Sixth Circuit overturned a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) on a technicality. 924(c) contains two separate offenses:

(1) using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and
(2) possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.

In Jones, the defendant pled guilty to a combination of the two offenses, “possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.” But the Sixth Circuit held in United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2004), that the government may not mix and match elements from the two separate 924(c) offenses. Accordingly, the defendant’s 924(c) conviction was overturned in Jones.

So it may pay off to go over the jury instructions and plea with a fine-toothed comb to look for any mismatching of the elements in a 924(c) appeal.

A sad day. . . .



Still reviewing opinion, but here's what I understand has gone down in Abbott and Gould regarding the “except” clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Unanimous decision (Justice Kagan did not participate). Docket No. 09--479 (Abbott was consolidated with Gould). A defendant subject to a mandatory, consecutive sentence under 924(c) is not spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum for a different count of conviction.

Abbott was convicted by jury on a 924(c) count and three other counts, namely two predicate drug-trafficking counts and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under the ACCA, he was subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for the felon-in-possession conviction. Court sentenced him to 20 years total, stacking the 15-year ACCA mandatory minimum with the 924(c) 5-year mandatory sentence.

Gould pleaded guilty to one 924(c) offense and to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base (10-year mandatory minimum sentence). District court sentenced him to 137 months on the drug count and added the 924(c) 5-year mandatory sentence to that term (for a total of 197 months).

Abbott and Gould argued that the additional 5-year mandatory sentence in 924(c) should not apply to them because of the statute's direction that the 5-year mandatory sentence should be imposed as a consecutive sentence "except" to the extent a greater mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise applicable under any other provision of law.

Supreme Court disagreed, concluding "except" clause applied only to 924(c) and (per a footnote without citation to any provisions other than 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)) that it applies to other provisions imposing greater mandatory minimums for offenses that embody all of the elements of a 924(c) offense. Court reasoned that the "except" clause, which was added in 1998, was part of a bill to throttle criminal use of guns. Bill’s primary objective was expansion of 924(c)'s coverage to reach firearm possession. Court reasoned that the interpretations of the clause offered by Abbott and Gould would produce sentencing anomalies.

Abbott and Gould argued that the then-mandatory Guidelines would have resolved any disparities. Court concluded it would not contradict that Abbott and Gould presented a rational, less harsh, mode of sentencing. But the Court did not think it was the mode Congress had ordered. Court also pointed to the syntax and context as bases for its decision. Court rejected application of the Rule of Lenity.